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The work at hand discusses the role of ‘good faith’ in the meaning of Article 7 of the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods (CISG).1
The CISG2 is a sales convention developed by  UNCITRAL3 with the objective to provide a uniform 
and fair regime for the international sale of goods.4
As a consequence, the uniform application of the Convention is main concern of the CISG. Art. 7 
provides a method to ensure that the Convention is applied in such uniform way. The provision lays 
down the three principles of interpretation of the CISG: ‘its international character’, ‘uniformity  in 
its application’ and the ‘observance of good faith in international trade’.5
However, with regard to the ‘good faith’ it must be recognised that  there are analogous domestic 
concepts of good faith on domestic level. Since the Convention is applied by domestic courts, there 
is always the danger that courts rely  on the domestic understanding of good faith when applying the 
CISG. Such application, however, contravenes the other two principles set forth in Art.7 (1) and 
eventually the main objective of the Convention: the uniform application of the CISG. 
The following master thesis shall examine whether the courts of different jurisdictions apply the 
good faith under Art.7 (1) in respect to the principles of internationality  and uniformity. For this 
purpose, jurisprudence from Germany  as representative of a civil law country will be compared 
with jurisprudence of the Federal Courts of the State of New York and the Commonwealth of 
Australia as common law representatives. This is of particular interest  since good faith is interpreted 
differently in the civil law and the common law. 
In order to structure the information, this thesis is divided into two main parts: a theoretical and an 
analytical segment. The theoretical part encompasses the chapter 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.
To begin with, this thesis will provide a brief overview over the legislative history and the current 
status of the Convention. Then, the next section 3 outlines the methodology in the case selection. 
This includes the approach towards the case selection as well as the comparative criteria. There are 
4
1 The articles which are not specifically designated are those of the ‘CISG’.
2 Hereinafter also referred to as the ‘Convention’.
3 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘UNCITRAL’
4 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG.html, accessed on 15 December 2017
5 Art. 7 (1) CISG
several databases that make search for international cases easily accessible for academic purposes. 
This dissertation includes cases from the CLOUT database,6  established by  the UNCITRAL 
Secretariat, the CISG Database at Pace University7 as well as CISG-online8.
In the following chapters, this thesis introduces the different approaches towards good faith in 
domestic law (chapter 4 and 5). In Germany good faith is a substantive doctrine, whereas in 
common law countries one cannot make a general assumption on the role of good faith. 
Historically, good faith merely  has the role of an interpretative guide. However, in the United States 
good faith is an important principle of law.
Thereafter, section 6 depicts the provision of Art. 7 (1). To begin with, the principles of 
internationality and autonomous interpretation of the CISG are introduced. Then, the work at hand 
discusses the controversial role of good faith in the Convention. For a better understanding of good 
faith under the CISG, the thesis elaborates the legislative history  of the term. Thereafter, this 
master’s thesis discusses if good faith under the CISG complies with one of the introduced domestic 
approaches towards good faith. 
Chapter 7 contains the case study. A total of 10 cases from Germany, the District of New York and 
the Commonwealth of Australia were selected in advance. The facts and the verdict  of the cases are 
summarised and then analysed. These cases were selected and reviewed with particular regard to 
the application of good faith. The analysis of the verdict discusses whether the court respected the 
principles of internationality and autonomous interpretation of the CISG. 
The work at hand concludes with an evaluation of the case study. In conclusion, it has been found 
that the international character – the uniformity  of the interpretation – is generally maintained. 
However, it  should be noted that in case 3 the German courts violate the principles of 
internationality and autonomous interpretation. Moreover, the study reveals that German courts 
apply  good faith more often and more excessive than their common law pendants. This is insofar 
interesting Germany applies good faith generously  in domestic law as well. Notwithstanding, it can 
be spoken of an autonomous interpretation of good faith under Article 7 (1). 
5
6 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html, accessed on 15 December 2017
7 http://iicl.law.pace.edu/cisg/cisg, accessed on 15 December 2017
8 http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/index.cfm?pageID=28, accessed on 15 December 2017
2. Current Status and Legislative History and of the CISG
This section provides an introduction to the Convention. For this purpose, the legislative history as 
well as the current status of the CISG will be outlined in this chapter. 
In 1980, the General Assembly of the United Nations held a conference to work on the United 
Nations Convention on Contract for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). The CISG was adopted 
on 10 April 1980 and entered into force on 1 January 1988.9  Since then, eighty-nine countries 
became contracting states of the Convention.10 All leading industrial nations – except for the United 
Kingdom – signed the Convention. It is, therefore, potentially  applicable for almost 80% of the 
world’s trade in goods.11  Nowadays, the CISG is often honored as the ‘most significant piece of 
substantive contract legislation in effect at the international level.’12  The Convention is a 
substantive law treaty  and has the objective to unify the international sales law.13 Advantage of the 
CISG is that it offers a uniform set of substantive rules which are particularly drafted for 
international transactions. 
The desire to unify international sales law goes back to the beginning of the last  century, However, 
only in 1964 the first  major step towards the unification of sales law was made. At that time the 
Hague Sales Convention was ratified. The 1964 Hague Sales Conventions, however, failed to gain 
acceptance and was of limited success. Therefore, in the 1970s UNCITRAL14  took up on the 
subject of the unification of international sales law which resulted in the CISG. Sixty-two countries 
participated actively  in the drafting process of the Convention. The records of the 1980 Vienna 
Conference (Travaux préparatoires) which drafted, discussed and ratified the Convention are 
publicly accessible.15 The Travaux préparatoires constitute an importance source of interpretation 
of the CISG.16
6
9 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG.html, accessed on 10 January 2018
10 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html, accessed on 10 January 2018
11 Stefan Kröll Loukas Mistelis & Pilar Perales in UN-Convention on the International Sales of Goods (CISG) (2011) at 
para 1
12 Kröll CISG op cit note 11 at para 2
13 Ingeborg Schwenzer Schlechtriem Schwenzer Kommentar zum Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht 6 ed (2013) at Präambel I
14 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
15 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_travaux.html, accessed on 10 January 2018
16 Kröll CISG op cit note 11 at para 2
3. Methodology
This master’s thesis contains a case study. Cases from Germany, Australia and the District of New 
York were reviewed and analysed. For this purpose, ten cases were selected. It is worth mentioning 
that the author initially wanted to include cases from the United Kingdom instead of Australian 
cases. However, the author is not aware of any  British case which deals with good faith under the 
CISG. Therefore, the United Kingdom eventually was excluded from the case study.
This section covers the criteria on the basis of which the cases were selected. As described earlier, 
the UNCITRAL Clout17, the PACE University database18  and the database of the University  of 
Bern19 served as sources. All selected cases deal with the application of good faith under Art. 7 (1). 
In order to find the selected cases the author used the search form provided by the three databases. 
The search parameters were the respective jurisdiction in combination with either Art. 7 (1) or the 
search term ‘good faith’. By way of illustration, with this approach the results were narrowed down 
from more than three thousand cases in the PACE database to less than fifty cases. In a second step, 
these cases were analysed. In the process, the results were further narrowed down by  excluding 
cases that only marginally touch the topic of good faith. With regard to Australia that meant that 
there were only two cases left. Both cases are included in this master’s thesis. Then, in a last step 
the most ‘interesting’ cases were chosen. ‘Interesting’ were cases where the application of good 
faith was either very  common in the respective jurisdiction or exceeding the domestic approach of 
good faith. By  ‘common application’ the author is referring to certain case groups which have 
developed in Germany. In these cases good faith is applied quite regularly under Art. 7 (1) by 
German courts. Because of the abundance the author has selected one representative case for each 
respective group. For the most part, the highest court’s decision which decided on the matter was 
selected. In one case, however, there was made an exception to this rule because of the poor 
presentability of the case.
In almost all cases, this master’s thesis depicts the final court decision. However, once again there is 
one noteworthy  exception: In case 3 the High Court and the German Federal Supreme Court come 
to different conclusions after the application of good faith. The author found that it is of particular 
7
17 http://www.uncitral.org/clout/index.jspx, accessed on 20 January 2018
18 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/, accessed on 20 January 2018
19 http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/index.cfm?pageID=28, accessed on 20 January 2018
interest to depict both views. Therefore, the decision of the High Court Karlsruhe is reflected as 
well. 
Eventually, ten cases were selected. Six cases are German court decision. Two cases each are from 
the District  of New York and Australia.The unequal allocation of cases is due to the gap  in cases 
which deal with the subject of good faith under Art. 7 (1).
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4. Good Faith in German National Law
4.1 General Remarks
‘An obligor has a duty to perform according to the requirements of good faith, taking customary 
practice into consideration.’20
This wording of section 242 of the German Civil Code21  – the ‘good faith’ provision – is 
misleading. According to a literal translation, section 242 GCC appears to regulate the way 
performance has to be rendered. However, the literal reading does not capture the (full) meaning of 
this provision. In fact, section 242 does not contain a detailed descriptive legal rule which legal 
consequences can be drawn from. Therefore, the provision is – in accordance with the intention of 
the legislator – an entrance gate to further development of the law by judicial decisions.22 Hence, 
the term of good faith sometimes appears very  broad and hard to capture. Nevertheless it is one of 
the most important legal principles in German law.23
An initial interpretation of the principle can be drawn from the wording of the provision. Good faith 
refers to the virtues of reliability and loyalty.24 However, to ensure a detailed understanding of good 
faith within the meaning of section 242 GCC it is best to take a look at the historical development 
of the term.
4.2 Legislative History of Good Faith
The origin of good faith in the German Civil Code goes back to Roman law. Nonetheless, the 
development of this legal term was by  no means linear. ‘Good faith’ is based on the ‘bona fides’ and 
‘aequitas’ which were fundamental principles of Roman law.25
9
20 Section 242 of the German Civil Code
21 Hereinafter also referred to as GCC
22 Holger Sutschet BeckOK BGB 43ed (2017) at 242 para 2
23 Claudia Schubert Münchener Kommentar zum BGB 7ed (2016) at 242 para 2
24 Heinz Peter Mansel Jauernig Kommentar zum BGB 16ed (2015) at 242 para 3
25 Franz Wieacker ‘Zum Ursprung der bonae fidei iudicia’ in Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte (1963)
In Roman law, the ‘bona fides’ principle had various functions. On the one hand, it  created 
secondary  obligations to the parties of a contract.26 On the other hand, judges would interpret  the 
contract under the ‘bona fides’ principle. Therefore, the ‘bona fides’ principle had a complementary 
impact on the content of the contract, as well as a monitoring effect.27 
The ‘aequitas’ principle was mostly a doctrine of equal treatment. It  was used as an objective 
benchmark for judicial evaluation of contractual obligations in order to avoid abuse of rights.28
The predecessors of the German Civil Code contained good faith as a general principle.29 However, 
good faith was viewed as a principle that had its origin in the private autonomy. Therefore, for the 
determination of good faith, one had to take into consideration the (presumed) intentions of the 
parties.30  This interpretation of the origin of the doctrine of good faith was as well predominant 
during the drafting rounds of the German Civil Code in the late nineteenth century. 
However, after the German Civil Code came into effect in 1900, a fundamental change in the 
interpretation of the source of the principle of good faith took place: courts no longer viewed good 
faith as part of the private autonomy but as a social principle.31 Such interpretation still prevails 
today. Thus, good faith became an objective standard and gateway of valuations of the 
constitutional rights and human rights.32 
As a consequence, the objective principle of good faith has to be differentiated from the intention of 
the parties (in accordance with section 133, 157 GCC) which prevails over section 242 GCC: 
relevant for the application of section 157 is what the parties subjectively want; relevant for the 
application of section 242 is what the parties are objectively supposed to do.33
The principle of good faith is not only  restricted to the application of private law. As a general 
doctrine it also applies – for instance – in procedural and public law.34
10
26 Heinrich Honsell Römisches Recht (2015) at 86
27 Schubert MüKo BGB op cit note 23 at 242 para 17
28 Schubert MüKo BGB op cit note 23 at 242 para 17
29 ie: Land Law of Baden (1810), the Rhenish Land Law (1814), the Civil Code of the Kingdom of Saxony (1863), the 
Civil Code of Bavaria (1861) or the French Code Civil (1807) which was effective in the western parts of today’s 
Germany
30 Konrad Schneider Treu und Glauben im Recht der Schuldverhältnisse 1902 at 48
31 ie: German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) BGH V ZR 108/53
32 Schubert MüKo BGB op cit note 23 at 242 para 22
33 German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) BGH V ZR 11/67
34 Sutschet BeckOK op cit note 22 at 242 para 4-12
Lastly, it should be noted that the legislator codified some case groups that have been developed 
with regard to good faith in the GCC35  The so-called culpa in contrahendo is the most prominent 
codified good faith provision. Since the reform of the law of obligations in 2001, it is codified in 
section 311 GCC and will be introduced in the course of this chapter. Those specific provisions 
prevail section 242 GCC.36 As a consequence, nowadays, section 242 GCC is used as a catch-all 
provision for the cases that are not recognised by a particular provision. 
4.3 Detailed Remarks on the Requirements for the Application of Section 242 GCC
Even though, as depicted above, good faith is also applied in German Procedural and Public Law 
this chapter explicitly addresses good faith in accordance with section 242 GCC.
To begin with it has to be said that – even though rights and obligations are being extended by the 
principle of good faith – section 242 GCC is not directly the basis for potential claims.37
As mentioned earlier, the meaning of good faith reaches far beyond the literal reading of section 
242 GCC. This can primarily  be attributed to further development of law by the courts. This makes 
it, however, hard to make general statements regarding the general conditions of the application of 
section 242 GCC. 
One of the counterarguments against the application of good faith by common law lawyers always 
has been that it is too vague and broad.38 And in fact, good faith is a so-called indeterminate legal 
term and as such by nature very  vague and broad.39 As depicted above, section 242 GCCe describes 
good faith broadly  as something that refers to the virtues of reliability and loyalty. Therefore, in 
order to ensure that the principle of good faith is not used in an excessive way it requires further 
specification. For this reason, courts developed specific case groups which the application of the 
11
35 ie: GTC review, consumer protection, the principle of valid subject matter or culpa in contrahendo
36 Sutschet BeckOK op cit note 22 at 311 para 43
37 Sutschet BeckOK op cit n note 22 at 242 para 40
38 See Chapter 5.1 ‘The Historic Development of Good Faith in Common Law’
39 Schubert MüKo BGB op cit note 23 at 242 para 1
doctrine is generally restricted to.40 Such case groups will be introduced in detail in the next sub-
chapter.
4.4 Case Groups Developed by the Courts
The development of law led to a differentiation in case groups to refine the doctrine and make it 
more tangible.41 These groups are: The ascertainment of the obligations (specification function), the 
establishment of secondary contractual obligations (complementary function), the prevention of 
abuse of rights or rather the impermissible exercise of rights (barrier function) and the monitoring 
function (correcting function).42 
4.4.1 The Specification Function
Closest to the wording of section 242 GCC is the application of good faith within the case group of 
the so-called specification function. This group is also the most direct implementation of the 
historical intention of the fathers of the German Civil Code.43  The diversity of life and complex 
constellations of interests makes it impossible for the legislator to foresee all necessary  obligations 
of the parties.44  In many cases, additional modifications to the parties‘ obligations by further 
development of law by the courts are required. Therefore, the principled open wording of section 
242 GCC offers high flexibility  to meet this need. This case group offers the opportunity  to modify 
a party’s obligation in each individual case.
Main application of the specification function is to encourage the parties to render their obligation 
in a thoughtful and faithful way.
For instance, this doctrine implies that the obligor has to perform his obligation in a purpose-driven 
way. But also the obligee has to show consideration for the justified and recognizable interests of 
the obligor.45  In many cases, this consists no obligation for the obligee but a restriction of his 
12
40 Mansel Jauernig op cit note 24 at 242 para 34
41 Schubert MüKo BGB op cit note 23 at 242 para 23
42 Sutschet BeckOK op cit note 22 at 242 para 29
43 Schneider Treu und Glauben op cit note 30 at 77
44 Schubert MüKo BGB op cit note 23 at 242 para 180
45 Reiner Schulze Schulze BGB 9ed (2017) at 242 para 15
rights.46  The scope of these obligations follows from the constitutional rights which constitute an 
objective value system.47 
4.4.2 The Complementary Function
Additionally, section 242 GCC is basis for the establishment of secondary contractual obligations. 
In some cases, this comprises performance-related obligations such as the requirement to provide 
information or reference. But partially, this also consists protection obligations such as the duty to 
refrain from something. For instance, after the acquisition of a company one can derive the 
restriction of competition from the good faith principle, even if the parties did not explicitly agree to 
competition restriction.48  However, the dividing-line between the complementary case group and 
the above introduced specification function group is blurred.49  Thus, some scholars even bundle 
both case groups as one.50
4.4.3 The Impermissible Exercise of a Right
The third case group  of the application of the doctrine of good faith is the prevention of 
impermissible exercise of rights where the principle has a barrier function. This case group includes 
the assertion of actually  existing rights which, however, contradicts the principle of good faith.51 
Good faith sets barriers where the utilization of a right leads to a result which is in an apparent way 
not compatible with law and justice.52 Historically, the case group of the impermissible exercise of a 
right goes back to the Roman law where one could raise the objection of fraudulent intent (exceptio 
doli praesentis).53 It is to be noted, however, that there is no ethical-legal obligation to waive a right 
just because it burdens the other party in an excessive way.54 
13
46 Mansel Jauernig op cit note 24 at 242 para 17
47 Schubert MüKo BGB op cit note 23 at 242 para 189
48 Sutschet BeckOK op cit note 22 at 242 para31
49 Schubert MüKo BGB op cit note 23 at 242 para 140
50 Schubert MüKo BGB op cit note 23 at 242 para 140
51 Mansel Jauernig op cit note 24 at 242 para 32
52 BGH NJW-RR 15 at 457 (459)
53 Mansel Jauernig op cit note 24 at 242 para 37
54 Schubert MüKo BGB op cit note 23 at 242 para 208
The case group  of impermissible exercise of a right can be further subdivided: On the one hand, if 
the exercise of a right itself is unlawful a breach of the good faith doctrine is given (exceptio doli 
praesentis).55 The special characteristic of these particular cases is the ethical-legal disapproval with 
the behaviour itself.56 A prime example of this case group is the attempted enforcement of right of 
information with the objective to uncover business secrets.57
On the other hand, even previous behaviour can lead to the application of the good faith principle. 
The exercise of a right is an impermissible exercise of a right if the initial behaviour which 
established the right was unlawful (exceptio doli praeteriti).58  The idea of this case group is that 
nobody should benefit from unlawful conduct.59 For instance, if one concludes a contract by fraud, 
threat or other dishonest behaviour, one cannot refer to the owed performances thereafter.60
Lastly, also previous behaviour which itself does not constitute an abuse of rights can still be 
impermissible if the party acts contradictory thereafter (venire contra factum proprium).61  General 
scope of application is that one party  created a situation of trust. As a consequence, the counter 
party  may rely  on a consistent behaviour thereafter. For instance, if the obligator hints that he will 
not raise the objection of the limitation period he cannot raise the objection regardless.62
4.5 Culpa in Contrahendo
Culpa in contrahendo literally translated means ‘fault in conclusion of a contract’.63 In German law, 
the culpa in contrahendo constitutes – under certain circumstances – a pre-contractual relationship 
14
55 Schubert MüKo BGB op cit note 23 at 242 para 243
56 BGH NJW-RR 1995 at 334 (336)
57 Mansel Jauernig op cit note 24 at 242 242 Rn.38
58 Schulze BGB op cit note 45 at 242 para 27
59 BGH NJW 1989 at 1826 (1826)
60 OLG München NJW-RR 2002 at 886 (888); However, in this case usually tthe special-law provision of section 123 
GCC is applied.
61 Schubert MüKo BGB op cit note 23 at 242 para 309
62 BGH NJW 1988 at 265 (266)
63 Sutschet BeckOK op cit note 22 at 311 para 37
between the parties.64  Such circumstances are for example the initiation of contractual 
negotiations.65 As a consequence, the doctrine of the culpa in contrahendo imposes specific duties 
on the involved parties. If a party  violates those duties, one can claim contractual damages no 
matter if a contract eventually was concluded or not.66  For instance, in a case where two parties 
negotiate and one of the parties obtains sensitive information during the negotiations and thereafter 
the party leaks the sensitive information. The other party can claim (contractual) damages on basis 
of the culpa in contrahendo even if the negotiations fail.
Historically, the doctrine of the culpa in contrahendo goes back to 1861. German scholar Rudolph 
von Jhering is considered as the founder of the culpa in contrahendo.67  Thereafter, the culpa in 
contrahendo regularly was used by courts and therefore generally  recognised.68  It  was directly 
derived from the good faith principle stated in section 242 GCC.69  In 2001, the culpa in 
contrahendo was codified in section 311 paragraph 2 GCC. The specific provisions of section 311 
GCC prevails section 242 GCC.70
4.6 General Requirements of Good Faith in Accordance with Section 242 GCC
Since the case groups differ so much, it  is very hard to make statements about the general 
requirements of good faith. However, there are two things that all case groups share. Therefore, 
these can be considered as the requirements that always need to be fulfilled in order to apply good 
faith in accordance with section 242 GCC.
To begin with, the first requirement of good faith can be derived from the systematical position of 
section 242 GCC. The provision is located in the second book the German Civil Code – the ‘Law of 
Obligations.’ Therefore, it  follows from a systematic interpretation that good faith requires some 
kind of contractual connection. This requirement, however, is traditionally interpreted widely: ‘Any 
15
64 Sutschet BeckOK op cit note 22 at 311 para 40
65 Emmerich MüKo BGB op cit note 23 at 311 para 42
66 Emmerich MüKo BGB op cit note 23 at 311 para 36
67 Rudolph v. Jhering Jherings Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des bürgerlichen Rechts, Vol.4 (1861)
68 ie. in RGZ 78 (7.12.1911) at 239 (240)
69 Emmerich MüKo BGB op cit note 23 at 311 para 36
70 Sutschet BeckOK op cit note 22 at 311 para 43
kind of legal relation’ is sufficient to meet the condition.71 This recognises, inter alia, the contract 
initiation, tortious acts or the connection emerged from a void contract.72 Notwithstanding, all case 
groups of good faith require some kind of contractual connection.
The second condition that all good faith case groups have in common is that they result from a 
comprehensive weighing of interests. By  that, one has to take all circumstances of the individual 
case into account. For instance, one needs to consider what event triggered the obstacle or if on a 
subjective level one party  abused their rights.73 Additionally, one has to consider what assessments 
the value order of the constitutional rights makes.74  The value order describes the different 
weighting which the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) attributes to the constitutional rights.75 
Eventually, these considerations lead to a risk allocation on which party has to bear the emerged 
disadvantages or advantages.76
4.7 Summary of the Understanding of Good Faith under German Law
The good faith principle is codified in section 242 GCC. As depicted above, good faith is a so-
called indeterminate legal term and as such by nature very vague and broad. Therefore, it was 
specified by further development of law by the courts. The courts developed certain case groups 
which specify the scope of application of good faith. 
In summary, good faith imposes duties and rights on the parties. It is considered to be one of the 
most important principles of German law.
16
71 Goes back to the Reichsgericht in RGZ 160 (24.03.1939) at 349 (357)
72 Sutschet BeckOK op cit note 22 at 242 para 14 and 15
73 Schulze BGB op cit note 45 at 242 para
74 Schulze BGB op cit note 45 at 242 para 13
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5. The Concept of Good Faith in Common Law
The Commonwealth of Australia and United States (more specifically the District of New York) are 
both common law jurisdictions. For this reason, one could be fooled and think the concept of good 
faith is treated similarly  in both jurisdictions. However, that is not  the case. Australia and the United 
States differ significantly in their approach towards good faith. In a first step, this section will 
provide a introduction to the traditional understanding of good faith in the common law. Then, in a 
second step this section will show the differences in the approaches towards good faith in the 
United States as well as Australia. However, in order to capture the traditional understanding of 
good faith one has to start with the historic development and the understanding of good faith in the 
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is the place where the origin of all common law systems lie.
5.1 The Historic Development of Good Faith in Common Law
As described in the previous chapter, most civil law countries do have a substantive obligation to 
act in good faith. In contrast, the common law has always rejected any attempts to introduce the 
concept of good faith – in a comprehensive and substantive sense – to contract  law.77 For instance, 
Lord Denning famously tried to establish a concept of ‘unconscionability’ in Lloyds Bank Ltd v 
Bundy78  but was resolutely repudiated by his fellow judges. The reason for the reservations towards 
a general doctrine of good faith is deeply entrenched in common law. In common law, traditionally, 
the avoidance of uncertainty in law plays a much bigger role than in civil law countries. To put it  in 
extreme terms, one might say that ‘the predictability of the legal outcome of a case is more 
important than absolute justice.’79  Abstract legal principles, and in particular the broad concept of 
good faith, do harm to the predictability  of a case. And in fact, Lord Ackner regarded such a concept 
as ‘too vague’ in Walford v Miles.80  Additionally, in common law countries, traditionally, the 
freedom of contract is of special importance. It is the parties duty  to look after themselves.81 As a 
consequence, common law countries have lesser desire to maintain strict fairness under all 
circumstances. Summarising, Great Britain does traditionally not have any concept comparable to 
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the substantive principle of good faith found in civil law countries. From a civil law perspective it 
is, however, very much in doubt whether a legal system can overcome all legal obstacles without 
good faith. And in fact, even though British law is not familiar with a general concept of good faith, 
it does now exist in some parts of British law. The remarks of LJ Bingham in the case Interfoto 
Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd 82  offer good access to the British 
conceptuality  of good faith. Firstly, he defines good faith by using such metaphorical terms as 
‘playing fair’, ‘coming clean’ and ‘putting one’s cards face upwards on the table’. In essence, 
according to LJ Bingham, good faith constitutes an ‘overriding principle’ of ‘fair and open 
dealing’83  which is an integral element of almost all civil law systems but not to common law 
countries. Notwithstanding, he concludes, British law has developed the so-called ‘piecemeal 
approach’ in respond to unfair dealing in contract law. Accordingly, good faith plays a role in 
particular situations. For instance, the piecemeal approach is applied in the contractual 
interpretation. Where the wording of a contract could result in an intolerable outcome, the court is 
ought to refer to the initial intention of the parties to reach a reasonable outcome.84 
Furthermore, both, the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 199385 and the Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 199986, impose obligations of good faith on the 
contractual parties. Interestingly, the Commercial Agents Regulations imposes a general duty for 
the commercial agent to act in good faith. The agent  is obliged to keep his principal informed at all 
times and must not keep secret commissions. He is not allowed to promote his own advantage over 
that of his principal.87 
Also, the British insurance law adopted the concept of good faith. Insurance contracts impose the 
duty of positive disclosure based on the principle of (utmost) good faith (uberrimae fidei).88 
Moreover, courts have imposed a duty of good faith in further contractual commitments such as 
employment89, partnership or franchise agreements. 
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Nonetheless, it should not remain unmentioned that Australian law does not apply the culpa in 
contrahendo – a concept which recognises a clear duty to negotiate with care. This duty in 
precontractual relations is derived from the doctrine of good faith and plays – as previously 
described – an important role in most civil law countries.90
In summary, British law does not recognise a comprehensive substantive concept of good faith. As 
seen above, good faith is only applied sporadically for exceptional cases. As long as the parties are 
acting honestly, good faith allows the parties to be unreasonable and negligent.91 To conclude, it 
should also be noted that British courts, in the absence of a principle of good faith, reach similar 
results as the common law countries that apply good faith on the basis of a doctrine of implied 
terms.92
5.2 Good Faith in American Law
Admittedly, the United States of America with its fifty different jurisdictions make it hard to find an 
encompassing statement on a legal topic. Nonetheless, one can state that good faith plays a much 
bigger role in the American law than in British law. 
Historically, the American courts have always been more open to a requirement of good faith than 
the British courts. First considerations by American courts of an explicit good faith duty go back to 
the late nineteenth century.93 The duty to perform a contract in good faith as a general principle was 
first recognised in 1932 by the New York Court  of Appeal in the case Kirke La Shelle Co. v Paul 
Armstrong Co.94
Since then, the principle of good faith has been codified in the areas of sales and commercial law. 
Certainly, as well as United Kingdom, the USA are not regulated by a civil code or commercial 
code. However, America does have a Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter UCC) and a 
Restatement of the Law Second Contracts which functions somewhat like a civil code.95 Since an 
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accurate classification of these papers is not always easy  for readers with a foreign law background, 
the master’s thesis at hand will hereafter quickly introduce both documents.
5.2.1 Introduction to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
The Restatement of the Law refers to a set of treatise on legal topics which aim to instruct judges 
and lawyers about general principles of American law. In essence, they restate existing common law 
into a series of principles of law.96 The Restatements were established in 1923 by the American Law 
Institute. The importance of said treatise cannot be stressed enough: Even though the Restatements 
are no primary  source of law, they are considered to be a persuasive source of law by  many courts.97 
Nowadays, the Restatements have been cited in almost 200.000 thousand court decisions and can 
therefore be called the most  important source of secondary authority.98 By now, there are four series 
of Restatements. The second series of Restatements deals with the field of contracts and 
commercial transactions and was published in 1981.99
5.2.2 Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code
The most prominent  act on commercial transactions in America is the UCC.100 The code regulates 
commercial transactions with one single noteworthy exception which is property dealings.101 It was 
first published in 1952 and contains a recommendation of laws that can be adopted by the Federal 
States.102 Objective of the UCC was the harmonisation of sales law within the United States.103 The 
UCC can be considered to be extremely successful in achieving this aim: These days, all Federal 
States have adopted the UCC.104 
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5.2.3 Good Faith in the Restatement of the Law and the Uniform Commercial Code
Interestingly, the UCC’s principal author Karl Llewellyn studied and taught in Germany and 
therefore, had a good knowledge of the German concept of good faith (Treu und Glauben).105 Upon 
his urging good faith was adopted to the code. All in all, good faith is mentioned in more than fifty 
sections of the UCC.106 On three occasions, the term ‘good faith’ is introduced explicitly. One being 
Section 1-304 UCC, in the General Provisions chapter, which reads as follows: 
‘Every contract or duty within the Uniform Commercial Code imposes an obligation of good faith 
in its performance and enforcement.’
To begin with, the doctrine of good faith under the UCC ought to be non-dispositive for the parties 
which shows the importance of the concept within the UCC.107  Indeed, this section imposes a 
general duty to perform in good faith for parties acting under the UCC. It should be noted that the 
good faith duty only refers to the performance and not to the formation of the contract.108 
Consequently, the UCC does not recognise any precontractual good faith obligations (culpa in 
contrahendo).109
The meaning of good faith under the UCC is then defined in Section 1-201 (20) UCC:
‘“Good Faith” [...] means honestly in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards 
of fair dealing.’
One should also mention that the UCC applies a different definition of good faith in relation to 
merchants in Section 2-103 (1)(b):
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‘“Good Faith” in the case of merchants means honestly in fact and the observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing in trade.’
It should be noted that the definition of good faith remains very vague. By making a distinction 
between the general application and the application for merchants, the UCC appears to intend – 
even though the wording is almost identical – to apply good faith for the latter in a somewhat more 
limited way.110  The key conclusion from the definition is that Section 1-201 (20) imposes an 
objective standard (reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing) as well a subjective element 
(honesty in fact).111  In summary, it can be stated that the UCC imposes a general concept from 
which positive duties for the parties to act in good faith can be derived. However, the nebulous 
definition has been cause of ever-continuing controversies about the scope and exact meaning of the 
concept of good faith under the UCC.112 As a consequence of the lack of clarity about the scope of 
the concept, courts tend to apply the duty to act in good faith generally cautiously.113 For instance, 
scholars observe, courts tend to apply  the concept in cases of intentional violations more 
regularly.114 By doing so, they disregard the objective dimension of the good faith definition under 
the UCC. 
Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which was published in 1981, was inspired 
by the UCC: 
‘“Good faith” performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed 
common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a 
variety of types of conduct characterized as involving "bad faith"  because they violate community 
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.’
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Moreover, Section 205 of the Restatement directly refers to Section 1-203 of the UCC, makes the 
distinction between good faith in performance and the formation of the contract and explicitly does 
not recognise precontractual duties of good faith. The doctrine of good faith in the Restatement is 
based on the UCC and a wide variety  of court decisions that impose such concept.115 As depicted 
above, the Restatements provide a very important reference book for judges and lawyers in the 
USA. For this reason, the impact of the recognition of a general concept of good faith is not to be 
underestimated.
In conclusion, the general substantive duty  to act in good faith is recognised by the UCC and the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Nevertheless, the scope of application of good faith is not 
always clear and courts lean towards a restrictive application of the concept.
5.3 Good Faith in the Commonwealth of Australia
The Commonwealth of Australia has nine different jurisdictions. For this reason, again the 
statement applies that it is hard to find an encompassing statement on good faith. As well as in 
United Kingdom, many Australian scholars have been skeptical about the adoption of a general 
principle of good faith: They  argued that such principle undermines the freedom of contract.116 
Therefore, it was only in 1992 when a court  mentioned the duty  of good faith in contract law. The 
Court of Appeal in New South Wales applied good faith in the case Renard Constructions Pty Ltd v 
Minister for Public Works.117 In this case, the court derived from good faith that ‘reasonableness in 
performance’ was implied in a sales contract. The court explicitly referred to concept of good faith 
in the CISG.
Some Australian scholars regarded this decision as ‘groundbreaking’.118 And indeed, since then, 
Australian courts have imposed a duty of good faith in the performance of contractual 
obligations.119
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With regard to Australia as a whole, the Federal Court of Australia applied a general contractual 
duty of good faith was first mentioned in 1997 in the case Hughes Aircraft Systems International v 
Air Services Australia.120  Thereafter, in the case Pacific Brands Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd the 
Federal Court explained that ‘the duty of good faith is an incident [...] of every commercial contract 
unless [it] is either excluded expressly or by  necessary implication.’121 From this remarks one can 
derive that good faith generally functions as a principle in Australian contract law. 
This leads to the question what such principle of good faith contains. The Federal Court simply 
defines good faith as not acting in bad faith.122 This negative definition is extremely vague and has 
to date not been further defined by the Federal Court. The Supreme Court of New South Wales, 
however, defined good faith as ‘acting in compliance with honest standards of conduct’.123 
From the aforesaid it is obvious that there is no consistent standard with the regard to the 
application of a duty  of good faith in Australian contract law. In addition, it should also not remain 
unmentioned that Australia’s highest court, the High Court of Australia, has not yet  decided if a 
general principle of good faith exists in Australian contract law. The court left this matter open in 
the case Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council.124 
In conclusion, the Australian approach towards good faith appears to be closer to the American 
view than that in the United Kingdom.125 However, the doctrine of good faith is still subject of an 
ongoing development process.
5.4 The Concept of Equitable Estoppel
Lastly, this dissertation briefly introduces the principle of estoppel. It  is not derived from the good 
faith doctrine.126 For this reason, this master’s thesis will not go into details about the doctrine’s 
scope or requirements. However, the principle is very similar to the venire contra factum proprium 
concept. Thus, it deserves at least a quick mention.
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The principle of estoppel aims at the protection of a party as a consequence from the other party’s 
contradictory behaviour.127
It goes back to the British case of Montefiori v Montefiori in 1762.128  In this case, Montefiori 
claimed the relief of a promissory  note from his brother. The promissory  note was handed over in 
order to create the impression of wealth and facilitate the defendant’s marriage. The court, however, 
argued that  the plaintiff acted contradictory and denied the relief. Nowadays, it is applied in almost 
all common law countries and certainly in United Kingdom, the United States of America and the 
Commonwealth of Australia.129
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6. Principles of Interpretation under the CISG
‘In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the 
need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international 
trade.’130
6.1 General Structure of Art.7 CISG
The Preamble of the Convention considers that its objective is to ‘eliminate barriers in 
international trade.’131 Bearing in mind that the CISG is applied by national courts and considering 
the differences between the legal systems of the participating member states, this aim is ambitious, 
to say the least. There is always the danger that the domestic courts might interpret  the provisions of 
the CISG influenced by  national rules.132  Art. 7 tries to counter this threat and tries to ensure an 
autonomous and uniform application.133 Therefore, many scholars regard Art. 7 as the key provision 
within CISG. However, in order to fully understand capture the importance of Article 7 one has to 
capture the structure of the provision from the scratch: Article 7 contains two paragraphs which 
mutually influence each other. 
 
Art. 7 (1) contains a triumvirate of – in principle equally  important – autonomous interpretative 
principles of the CISG: the international character, the uniformity in its application and the 
observance of good faith in international trade.134  These general principles are the interpretative 
standard when the Convention leaves room for conflicting interpretation and the provision itself 
does not offer a specific interpretative standard.135 For instance, the ‘fundamental breach’ under Art.
25 CISG, ‘impediment’ under Art.79 CISG or under Art.3 CISG the use of the terms ‘substantial 
part’ and ‘preponderant part.’
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Art.7 (2) draws a distinction between internal gaps (lacunae praeter legem) and external gaps 
(lacunae intra legem).136 An internal gap is a matter that is governed by  the Convention but not 
explicitly settled in it. These matters are decided by the general principles on which the Convention 
is based. This will be of significance for the subsequent considerations with regard to the principle 
of good faith. External gaps are matters that are not governed by  the CISG. In this case, the 
Convention provides a recourse to domestic law determined by  the conflict of law rules of the 
forum. However, the recourse to national law is the ultima ratio.137
6.2 The International Character and the Uniformity in the Application of the CISG as 
Foundations of the CISG
Objective of the CISG is to provide a uniform legislation for the international sale of goods.138 The 
autonomous interpretative criteria in Article 7 (1) serve this goal and try  to preserve the uniform 
application of the CISG. Accordingly, as mentioned above, many  regard Art.7 (1) to be the most 
important provision of the Convention. 
This view is supported by the structure of the CISG: The Articles one through six of the Convention 
do not deal with substantive matters. The first six Articles mainly address the matters of application 
and general scope of the CISG. Therefore, Art. 7 is the first provision with a substantive 
regulation.139 
On the other hand, the importance of the provision can be derived from the legislative history  of the 
Convention. The drafters of the CISG anticipated the problem of diverse connotations of legal terms 
and feared a domestic-oriented interpretation of the Convention.140 For this reason, they  tried to use 
a so-called ‘lingua franca’ and to avoid the use of terms with domestic connotations within the 
CISG.141 For instance, the drafters invented the term of ‘fundamental breach’ in Art. 25 which has 
no close equivalent on domestic level. However, a recourse to ‘plain language’ is hardly possible in 
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a consistent way and the use of terms with similar names on a domestic level is inevitable.142 For 
this reason, the closely  connected interpretative criteria of internationality and uniformity were 
invented in Art. 7 (1). As both principles serve the objective of the unification of sales law, they  are 
‘functionally interrelated and interdependent.’143
The principle of internationality  implies that the CISG is to be interpreted autonomously.144 This 
means that, principally, the Convention is to be interpreted on the basis of itself.145 A recourse to the 
rules and terms of the applicant’s domestic legal system – generally – is to be avoided.146 In fact, a 
recourse to domestic case law is the ultima ratio and merely an option when all other relevant 
interpretation and gap-filling techniques have been exhausted. The placement and clear wording are 
ought to stress the significance of focusing on the international character and the desire of the 
drafters to abandon domestic rules.147 
The objective of uniformity ‘aims to ensure that uniform rules will be considered the common 
denominator [...] independent from the nationality of the parties, the place of performance, or the 
kind of goods.’148 Uniformity  aims inter alia at the avoidance of so-called forum shopping which 
means that one party  chooses a forum with a more favourable jurisprudence.149  Nowadays, the 
principle of uniformity  is widely understood as a call for the applicants of the Convention to seek 
for solutions that are likely to be recognised by the courts of other member states.150 However, the 
principle of uniformity is not supposed to be understood as a tool to ‘freeze the Convention in 
time.’151 Like any  other legislative system, the CISG is continuously subject to change. In order to 
achieve the aim of a uniform application of the Convention, UNCITRAL has to ensure that judges 
have access to CISG court decisions and arbitral awards. For instance, the existence of the CLOUT 
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(Case law on UNCITRAL texts) database can be directly derived from the principle of 
uniformity.152
In summary, it can be claimed that the importance of the principles of internationality cannot be 
stressed enough since the success of an international sales convention highly relies on preserving 
uniformity in its application. Scholars agree on the fact that the principles have proven to be very 
successful in practice.153 However, the work at hand will show whether this is also the case for the 
application of good faith within the meaning of Art.7 (1).
6.3 The Observance of Good Faith in International Trade
For the work at hand it is of major importance to determine which role was assigned to good faith 
by the drafters of the Convention as there are many different views on ‘how’ good faith is to be 
applied. On the basis of the previous chapter, it is needless to say that a recourse to domestic rules 
in order to determine the principle of good faith is to be avoided. Firstly, one has to take into 
account the location of good faith within the CISG and the legislative history. Article 7 (1) names 
good faith as one of the three general principles of interpretation of the CISG. This is the only 
provision that mentions good faith within the Convention. On first glance, this might not appear 
notable. However, civil law and common law have fundamentally different approaches to 
legislative drafting and interpretation.154 This is reflected by the controversies around the term of 
good faith during the drafting of the Convention. The concept of good faith was one of the most 
controversially discussed topics in the process of the drafting of the CISG.155  On the one hand, 
representatives of mainly common law countries were in favour of leaving good faith out of the 
CISG. They argued that the concept of good faith itself is too broad and vague. As a consequence, 
the application of good faith by the courts might be influenced by the domestic legal systems which 
would then contradict the objective of uniformity in the application of the CISG.156
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On the other hand, representatives of mainly civil law countries argued for the imposition of 
positive duties for the contractual parties to act in good faith.157 These delegates tried to impose an 
application of good faith as a standard of conduct of the parties during the formation and 
performance of the contract.158
It appears implausible that a comprise could be negotiated between these two seemingly 
irreconcilable views. However, eventually, the delegates agreed to place good faith as a principle of 
interpretation in Article 7 (1).159
This raises the question of which conclusion could be drawn from the placement of good faith 
within the Convention. As one can easily note, the location and wording indicates that good faith is 
at least is one of the general principles of interpretation of the Convention. 
However, it  remains questionable if the doctrine of good faith is limited to its application as a tool 
of interpretation in relation to the Convention or if the agreement and the duties of the parties also 
have to be viewed in light of good faith.
Additionally  one has to ask for the scope of the concept: Does the principle of good faith only apply 
for Art.7 or does it permeate the whole text of the CISG?
Some authors like Allan E. Farnsworth strictly  follow the view that good faith only is a mere 
principle of interpretation.160 Their main argument is based on the legislative history. They argue 
that Art. 7 (1) – as pointed out above – reaches a compromise between the civil law and common 
law approach towards good faith. 
The wording of the Convention does not explicitly impose any  positive duty for the contractual 
parties to act in good faith.161 Moreover, the CISG only refers specifically to the Convention which 
should be interpreted in light of good faith. In contrast, an obligation to interpret the contract of sale 
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considering the doctrine of good faith remains unmentioned. Exceeding the wording of Art. 7 (1) 
would contradict the well documented compromise between the delegations.
Therefore, they conclude, good faith merely is a general principle of interpretation for the 
Convention (not the contract of sale).162
Nonetheless, other scholars like Franco Ferrari suggest a wider application of the principle of good 
faith instead of implementing the exact wording of Art. 7 (1). They  argue that – as depicted above – 
it is a fact that the delegates agreed to not include a positive duty of good faith in the legislative text 
of the Convention. However, the text does not explicitly say that there is no substantive principle of 
good faith either. Therefore, good faith is not limited to the above mentioned strictly interpretational 
approach. Most proponents of a wider application of good faith use Art. 7 (2) to expand the 
principle.163 Art. 7 (2) reads as follows:
‘Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention [...] are to be settled in conformity with 
the general principles on which it is based [...].’
Art. 7 (2) invites to infer general principles for internal gap filling.164 If the principle of good faith is 
a general principle on which the Convention is based, it  is one of the principles that have to be used 
for internal gap filling. Eventually, the question might arise whether good faith is a general principle 
in accordance with Art. 7 (2).
To begin with, one could argue that good faith is only explicitly used in Art. 7 (1) which refers to 
the interpretation of the Convention. Hence, it  seems inappropriate to give good faith the 
significance of a general principle.165
However, one has to bear in mind that specific manifestations of the principle of good faith are 
found all over the Convention.166 For instance, specific manifestations of good faith as a standard of 
conduct are found in Art.8, 16(2)(b) and 29(2). Art.80 contains the venire contra factum proprium 
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principle which is one of the main application areas of good faith in German law.167 The principle of 
good faith is also found in Art.40 which refers to bad faith and in the principle of mitigation of 
damages in Art.77. The amount of provisions that are based on the principle of good faith indicates 
that it  is more than just a mere interpretative principle of the Convention but a substantive 
doctrine.168 Accordingly, nowadays good faith is broadly recognised as a general principle on which 
the CISG is based. The prevailing view in jurisprudence169  and literature170  pleads for a wider 
application of the principle of good faith as a substantive doctrine through Art. 7 (2).
Subsequently, this leads to the question of the scope of the application of good faith as a general 
principle through Art. 7 (2) since the wording of Art. 7 (2) clearly limits the application of the 
general principles of Art. 7 (2) to ‘[...] questions concerning matters governed by this Convention 
[...].’171 This ties in with Art. 4 which defines what matters are governed by the CISG:
‘This Convention governs only the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations 
of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract. [...].’172
Consequently, matters within the scope of the CISG are the formation of the contract and rights and 
obligations of the parties. Accordingly, the principle of good faith does not  extend to third parties or 
the validity of the contract.173
It is also broadly recognised that generally  the doctrine of good faith is not applicable to pre-
contractual liability (culpa in contrahendo) under the CISG.174  The main argument against the 
application of good faith in these cases is based on the legislative history. Delegates of the former 
Democratic Republic of Germany made a proposal to regulate pre-contractual liability. However, 
this suggestion was rejected.175
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Lastly, it should also be mentioned that some scholars even go as far as to derive a substantive 
principle of good faith directly from Art.7(1).176  Nevertheless, considering the legislative history 
and placement of the principle this seems to be a bit of a stretch. 
In summary, it  can be stated that the principle of good faith is more than a mere general principle of 
interpretation as it  could be concluded by interpreting the wording of Art.7(1). The principle of 
good faith is rather a general principle on which the CISG is based. As such, it is applied as a 
substantive doctrine through Art.7(2). However, the application of Art.7(2) is limited to the 
formation of the contract and the rights and obligations of the parties. Therefore, one must be 
particularly careful to not use the doctrine of good faith in an excessive manner.
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7. Case Study
7.1 Case 1: German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) BGH VIII 60 01 
7.1.1 Abstract
In the present case, the German defendant (the ‘seller’) and the Spanish plaintiff (the ‘buyer’) 
concluded a contract for a used gear cutting machine. The contract contained the obligation to 
install the machine at the buyer’s premises. The seller’s written confirmation of the order comprised 
a reference to his standard terms and conditions. These standard terms included an exclusion from 
liability for any defects in used machinery. It is noteworthy that the terms were not attached to the 
order confirmation. 
Subsequently, the installation of the gear cutting machine turned out to be problematic: The 
responsible mechanic was overstrained with setting up  the machine and the machine could only  be 
utilized operationally  with assistance of an outside technician. The buyer claimed reimbursement 
for the delay  and the additional costs of the installation. The seller, however, refused to pay and 
referred to the standard terms which excluded him from any liability.
The German Federal Supreme Court  held that the claim should be decided in accordance with the 
CISG. Thereafter, the relevant question of the case is whether the standard terms became integral 
part of the contract. In order to answer this question, the court had to define the requirements for the 
incorporation of standard terms by reference into international sales agreements.
To begin with, the court observed that the Convention lacks specific rules on the inclusion of 
standard terms by  reference. Therefore, the court set  forth, the general rules on interpretation and 
formation of the contract (Art. 8, 14 and 18) are applicable. Then, the court stated that it  is not 
enough to refer to the terms. Instead, the recipient must be given the opportunity to read the 
standard terms. The Federal Supreme Court derived such duty from the general principle of good 
faith.
The court argued that ‘due to the difference between the many legal systems and traditions 
worldwide, standard terms used in one particular country often differ considerably from those used 
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in another.’177  Thus, for the recipient the access to the country-specific standard terms and 
conditions is of great importance. Furthermore, it does not pose any difficulties for the offeree to 
simply  attach the terms. In addition, if the recipient had to make an inquiry about the terms, it 
would lead to ‘delay [...] which would be unnecessary and unwelcome for both parties.’178
This goes to say  that the standard terms and conditions can only  become part  of the contract if the 
conditions are visibly attached. In the case at hand, the terms were apparently  not incorporated into 
the contract. The court found that the claim of the buyer for reimbursement was justified.
7.1.2 Analysis of the Verdict in Light of Art.7
The German Federal Supreme Court determined the requirements for the incorporation by reference 
of standard conditions into sales contracts by  interpreting Art. 8 in light  of good faith in 
international trade in accordance with Art. 7 (1). The court  imposed a duty to visibly attach such 
standard terms to the offer. In conclusion, it has to be said that the court  uses good faith as a tool of 
interpretation since it correlates with the wording of Art.7 (1) as well as with the compromise found 
by the delegates in the 1980 Vienna Conference.179 Hence, the court derives a positive duty from 
said interpretation. Eventually, notwithstanding the use as a tool of interpretation, good faith is used 
as a standard of conduct during the formation of the contract.
The court argues that such positive duty is derived from the loyalty  principle and the obligation of 
the parties make required information accessible and cooperate. Both duties arise out of the 
principle of good faith and are well known within the Convention. The obligation to cooperate is 
the underlying principle in Art. 32 (3) and 60 (a).180  Therefore, the loyalty principle and the 
obligation of the parties to give information and cooperate are generally  accepted as standard of 
conduct within the CISG.181 Nonetheless, as depicted earlier, it is nowadays generally accepted by 
courts and scholars that  good faith is not only an interpretative tool but a standard of conduct.182 
Thus, the court does not exceed the use of good faith. 
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In addition, the verdict of the court is in line with the principles of internationality and uniformity 
which are embodied in Art. 7(1): The court’s solution for the duty of incorporating standard terms 
by reference is well suited to be recognised by the courts of other member states since it  exclusively 
uses provisions and principles within the Convention. Therefore, it serves the objectives of the 
principle of internationality well.183 
To mention one example: A Spanish court argued with the same cooperation duty derived from the 
good faith principle in a case from 2007.184 Apparently, in said case it was questionable whether the 
standard terms in a foreign language were included to the agreement or not. It  is, however, not 
recognisable from the English abstract in the CLOUT database if the Spanish court particularly 
referred to this decision by the German Federal Supreme Court. Moreover, it remains unclear if the 
Spanish court was even aware of this decision.
In summary, this decision of the German Federal Supreme Court throws light on the question of the 
requirements for the incorporation of terms and conditions in an autonomous way. Therefore the 
court pays the necessary attention to the principles of internationality and uniformity  in the 
application of the CISG.
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7.2 Case 2: High Court Munich (Oberlandesgericht München) 7 U 2959/04 
7.2.1 Abstract
In the case at hand, the plaintiff (the ‘seller’) operated a leather tannery  in Italy. The defendant (the 
‘buyer’) was a German manufacturer of furniture. The parties concluded a contract for the purchase 
of leather. Before this agreement, the involved parties have had prior business relationships. In the 
instant case, the buyer refused to pay the full purchase price. He argued that  the claim for payment 
of the purchase price is setoff against a counterclaim by the defendant. As a result of the refusal to 
pay, the seller claimed the outstanding purchase price on basis of Art. 53 before the court. 
For background information, basis for the defendant’s counterclaim is that the seller refused to 
perform his obligation to deliver leather in an earlier sales contract. As a consequence of the 
delivery refusal, the defendant had to buy more expensive goods in replacement of the plaintiff’s 
performance. The reimbursement claim of the additional cost of the covering purchase is basis of 
the counterclaim.
With regard to the delivery  refusal in the previous sales contract, the plaintiff argued that such 
contract was never concluded and, in any case, the BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) 
crisis, which took place at the time, impeded a performance of the contract.
Firstly, the High Court outlined that all contractual agreements subject to this case are governed by 
the CISG. Secondly, the court stated that the contract on which the counterclaim was based was 
concluded and the performance – in light of the BSE crisis – was reasonable.
Lastly, the court raised the question whether the defendant’s counterclaim is legitimate. Basis for 
the counterclaim is Art. 76. This provision, however, requires that in order for the aggrieved party to 
claim damages under Art. 76, it has to declare the ‘avoidance of the contract’ before undertaking the 
substitute purchase.185 The conditions of the declaration of avoidance are defined in Art. 49.
In the present case, the buyer did not declare the avoidance of the contract. However, the High 
Court stated, in order to maintain fairness under the principle of good faith, that  the plaintiff could 
not rely on the requirement of a declaration of avoidance.
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As a result, the High Court decided that the counterclaim of the defendant was justifiable and the 
plaintiff’s claim for the purchase price was setoff.
7.2.2 Analysis of the Verdict in Light of Art. 7
The legal main issue is whether the requirement of the declaration of avoidance for a claim under 
Art. 75 or 76 is dispensable in certain situations. If yes, subsequently, one has to ask if the case at 
hand could be regarded as such situation. To begin with, it  should be outlined that  the explicit 
wording of the Convention does not recognise any exception to the requirement of the declaration 
of avoidance of the contract.186  Notwithstanding, the court decided that the respondent could not 
rely  on the declaration of avoidance if he ‘seriously and finally refused to perform under the sales 
contract’.187 In the present case, the plaintiff even denied the existence of any performance duty and 
therefore ultimately refused to perform. As depicted above, the High Court bases this view on the 
good faith principle in accordance with Art. 7. The High Court ‘s argument is easy to follow: 
Somebody who seriously  and ultimately refuses to perform acts contradictorily if he later wants to 
rely  on the requirement of avoidance. Such behaviour violates the venire contra factum proprium 
principle which is a particular form of the good faith doctrine. As mentioned earlier, the venire 
contra factum proprium principle is a well-established case group within the application of good 
faith under the German Civil Code.188 And in fact, in damage claims under Section 280, 281 of the 
German Civil Code the prevailing view waives the requirement of declaration of avoidance by 
referring to the venire contra factum proprium principle.189  In such cases, it is argued that  the 
declaration of avoidance would be unjustified formalism which is apparently the same argument the 
High Court used at the present case.190
One could argue that  the court decision at hand was influenced by domestic law which would be a 
violation of the principles of internationality and uniformity of interpretation in accordance with 
Art.7 (1). However, as depicted in detail in chapter 6.3, the existence of a general substantive 
principle of good faith in the CISG is widely  accepted nowadays. The recognition of good 
According to the prevailing view, Art.7 (2) is used to expand the application of good faith. 
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Admittedly, the High Court does not derive the existence of a doctrine of good faith in a strict 
dogmatic way. Notwithstanding, it has to be noted that the Convention recognises the principle of 
contradicting conduct. The venire contra factum proprium principle is found in Art. 8 (3) and 16 (2)
(b). Therefore, it is widely recognised to be a general expression of good faith in the Convention.191  
In conclusion, the court argues within the generally  accepted scope of the good faith doctrine under 
the CISG. In addition, the court exclusively  refers to the CISG and does not quote any  of the court 
decisions which have been developed under the German Civil Code. Thus, the ruling of the court 
does not violate the principle of internationality and uniformity. 
In the case at hand, the good faith principle is applied in accordance with the requirement of an 
autonomous interpretation of the Convention. It can be stated that all in all the court’s decision is 
perfectly in line with the principles set out in Art. 7 (1).
On a side note, the court did not raise the question whether the setoff against a claim is governed by 
the Convention. This question is rather disputed. There will be detailed remarks on the question if a 
setoff claim is governed by the CISG in case 4.
Lastly, it  should not remain unmentioned that previously in similar cases courts interpreted the 
declaration of avoidance in line with the ruling of the present case.192
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7.3 Case 3: High Court Karlsruhe (Oberlandesgericht) 1 U 280/96; German Federal Supreme 
Court (Bundesgerichtshof) VIII ZR 259/97 
7.3.1 Abstract
This case was brought before the High Court Karlsruhe as Appellate Court and then reviewed by 
the German Federal Supreme Court. In this case, both courts address the principle of good faith and 
eventually come to different conclusions. For this reason, this master’s thesis analyses both 
decisions.
The Austrian plaintiff (the ‘buyer’) was a producer of steel sheets. In order to protect the steel 
sheets during the transport  the plaintiff used adhesive foil covers. The defendant (the ‘seller’) is a 
German company which produced adhesive foil covers. The plaintiff concluded a contract for the 
purchase of adhesive foil covers with the plaintiff. 
Having said that, the adhesive foil covers were lacking the contractual agreed conformity as it was 
impossible to remove the foil after transport without damaging the steel sheets. Upon delivery, the 
buyer did not give notice to the seller of any defects of the foil. However, following a customer’s 
complaint the buyer gave such notification twenty four days after delivery of the goods.
Subsequently, the plaintiff and the defendant negotiated for almost fifteen month on reimbursement 
for the sustained costs. During the negotiations the defendant did not raise the objection that the 
buyer failed to give timely  notice of the defect. Eventually, the parties could not agree on 
reimbursement. The issue before the court was whether the plaintiff could claim reimbursement for 
all costs he sustained or not.
Firstly, the High Court  held that the sales contract between the plaintiff and the defendant  is 
governed by  the CISG. Therefore, basis for the claim are the provisions of Art. 35, 74. Secondly, the 
High Court stated that the delivered adhesive foil covers did lack conformity with the contract in 
accordance with Art. 35, 36. 
Then, the court addressed the question if the buyer had not given notice of the defects within 
reasonable time. In accordance with the provision of Art. 38 the buyer must examine the goods in as 
short as time as is practicable in the circumstances. Moreover, Art. 39 states that the buyer loses the 
right to rely on the lack of conformity if he does not notify  the seller ‘within reasonable time after 
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he ought to have discovered the defect.’193 In the case at hand, the court held that even in the case of 
a long-term business relationship the plaintiff had an obligation to carry out a test performance of 
the adhesive foil covers. In this instance, the High Court concluded, a notification period of ten to 
eleven days was reasonable. The plaintiff gave such notice only twenty four days after the delivery 
of the adhesive foil covers. Thus, the plaintiff failed to give timely  notification in accordance with 
Art. 38, 39. 
Then, the court considered Art. 40 which states that the defendant cannot  rely on the provisions of 
Art. 38, 39 if the lack of conformity relates to facts of which he knew. Clearly, the seller knew about 
the use of acrylic adhesive. In question is, however, if the seller knew or could have known that the 
use of acrylic adhesive constitutes a defect. This is to be proven by the buyer. In summary, the court 
held that the buyer did not proof that the seller knew or could have known. Therefore, the court 
concluded, Art. 40 is not concerned. Moreover, the court examined whether the exception of Art. 44 
is given. This provision is concerned when the plaintiff is able to give a reasonable excuse for the 
failure to notify timely. However, that was not the case since improper examination is no reasonable 
excuse in accordance with Art. 44. 
Lastly, the High Court considered if the defendant had waived his right to rely  on the notification 
duty. The execution of rights, the court stated, always has to be examined in light of the principle of 
good faith. In the present case, the seller did not mention the breach of the notification duty during 
the negotiations between the plaintiff and the defendant. The conduct of the seller could constitute a 
contradictory behaviour. As a consequence, the venire contra factum proprium doctrine could be 
applicable. However, in the High Court’s opinion this was not the case: ‘The mere availability of 
the seller to reach a settlement agreement does not in itself imply a loss of the right to plead that the 
notice of lack of conformity was not timely. The intention to waive the defence must be clearly 
established.’194 Additionally, the High Court pointed out, the idea of an implied waiver would have 
the effect  that all willingness to negotiate would put the plaintiff in danger of losing the right to rely 
on the notification duty. Therefore, the defendant had not waived his right to rely on the notification 
duty.
Im summary, the High Court  decided that the claim of the buyer was in-justified due to the breach 
of the notification duty in accordance with Art. 38, 39.
41
193 Art. 39 CISG
194 High Court Karlsruhe (Oberlandesgericht) 1 U 280/96
The German Federal Supreme Court, however, overruled the High Court’s verdict. Unlike the High 
Court, in the Supreme Court’s opinion the defendant waived his right to rely  on the notification 
duty. The court pointed out that the defendant agreed without reservation with the plaintiff’s notice 
of defects. Subsequently, the parties exclusively  negotiated over the manner of settlement and the 
particular amount of damages. In fifteen months, the seller did not once mention the breach of the 
notification duty. All things considered, the Supreme Court stated that the ‘idea of a mere 
arrangement must have been far from the [buyer]’s thoughts’.195 The Supreme Court also addressed 
the consideration of the High Court that  the idea of an implied waiver would have the effect that all 
willingness to negotiate would put the plaintiff in danger of losing the right to rely on the 
notification duty. In the case at hand, by  mentioning the notification duty the plaintiff would have 
shown that the compensation offer is of obliging character. 
For this reasons, the Supreme Court held that the seller had waived his right to rely on the 
notification duty. Therefore, the claim for damages was justified under Art. 35, 74.
7.3.2 Analysis of the Verdict in Light of Art.7 (1)
In the present case, the main question was whether the defendant had waived his right to rely  on the 
notification duty in light of the general principle of good faith. Such exclusion of the notification 
duty because of contradictory behaviour is widely recognised by scholars196 and courts197 under the 
application of Art. 38, 39. In such cases, generally, the principle of good faith is applied 
restrictively.198 Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court’s line of arguments is conclusive. Especially 
the point that by mentioning the notification duty during the negotiations the seller would have 
highlighted the obliging character of the compensation offer even more. The Supreme Court 
convincingly  showed that the seller’s conduct  during the negotiations was contradictory  to the 
following raise of the objection. As a consequence, the seller had waived his right in light of the 
good faith principle.
In this case, however, it is much more interesting to focus on the principles of internationality  and 
autonomous interpretation. The High Court, as well as the Supreme Court, refer to the German 
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Commercial Code. With regard to the notification duty under section 377 of the German 
Commercial Code it is settled case law in Germany that entering negotiations over an alleged defect 
does not mean that the seller waives the objection to delay. The German Federal Supreme Court 
explicitly states: ‘There are no reservations against applying these principles, developed for German 
national law, within the scope of the CISG.’199  As a consequence, both courts apply  the 
requirements developed for the German Commercial Code in the present case (even though they 
came to different conclusions on whether the requirements are fulfilled). However, as depicted 
earlier, the Convention is to be interpreted autonomously.200 This means that, principally, the CISG 
is to be interpreted on the basis of itself. A recourse to the rules and terms of the domestic legal 
system is to be avoided. It is only  possible to refer to domestic law when all other relevant 
interpretation and gap-filling methods have been exhausted.201  A recourse to national law is the 
ultima ratio. 
However, in this case there was no need to refer to domestic law as good faith is a substantive 
doctrine within the CISG. The courts could have applied the principle of good faith autonomously. 
Thus, the courts technically violated the principles of internationality and autonomous 
interpretation. 
Having said that, as mentioned earlier, the Convention recognises the principle of contradicting 
conduct. The venire contra factum proprium principle is found in the Articles 8 (3) and 16 (2)(b). 
The courts could have made the exact same considerations under the CISG. For this reason, even 
though the courts referred to domestic law it is not unlikely  that the court’s considerations will be 
recognised by  the courts of other member states in future decisions. Therefore, the violation of the 
principles internationality and autonomy are, if so to say, no ‘serious breaches’. 
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7.4 Case 4: German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) VIII ZR 394/12 
7.4.1 Abstract
The defendant (the ‘buyer’) is a German company  which is a supplier for the automotive industry. It 
mainly produces automotive components made of plastic. For this purpose, the defendant required 
customised moulds in which the liquid plastic gets poured with dimensional accuracy. The 
Hungarian plaintiff (the ‘seller’) supplied the defendant with such customised moulds since the 
beginning of 1998. The last two sales contracts between the parties were concluded in 2000 and 
2001. 
With regard to the sales contract concluded in 2001, the defendant gave notice that the delivered 
moulds were lacking the contractual agreed conformity. Thereupon, the plaintiff tried to remedy the 
defect by  repair. However, the defendant was not satisfied with the result of the subsequent 
improvement. As a consequence, the defendant declared the contract avoided in accordance with 
Art. 49 (1)(a) and claimed damages. 
With respect to the sales contract concluded in 2001, the defendant declared avoidance of the 
contract even before the goods were delivered. Notwithstanding, the plaintiff delivered the moulds 
which the defendant took. Again, the defendant gave notice about the lack of contractual 
conformity.
Subsequently, the defendant himself remedied the defects in all delivered moulds.
The plaintiff claimed payment of the purchase price under the sales contracts from 2000 and 2001 
before the court. Contrarily, the defendant argued that he declared avoidance of both contracts. 
Additionally, the defendant argued that  such claims for payment are setoff against a counterclaim 
by the defendant. Said counterclaim was based on the costs incurred for the subsequent 
improvement of the moulds by the defendant himself. 
To begin with, the German Federal Supreme Court held that the sales contracts are governed by  the 
CISG. Then, the court stated that two contracts were concluded. As a consequence, the plaintiff can 
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generally  demand payment of the purchase price in accordance with Art. 53. However, an exception 
to this is made if the defendant successfully declared avoidance of the contract.
The prerequisite for declaring a contract avoided under Art. 49 (1)(a), in case of timely  delivery, is a 
fundamental breach. Therefore, it has to be determined whether there was a fundamental breach of 
the contract or not. In accordance with Art. 25, a breach is fundamental if the defect results in such 
detriment to the other party  that it deprives ‘him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract 
[...].’202  The court held that  the delivered moulds in fact did not conform with the contract and 
therefore constitute a defect under Art. 35 (2). However, the court found that the defect was not 
fundamental. It argued that the avoidance of the contract is the ultima ratio under the Convention. 
Therefore, a fundamental breach requires a situation that the defect to a situation where the buyer is 
no longer interested in the contractual performance of the seller due to heavy defects.. In this case, 
the defendant was still interested in the performance which is reflected by the fact that  he remedied 
the defects himself. For this reason, the defect was not considered to be fundamental under Art. 25.
As a consequence, the requirements for avoidance of the contract under Art.49 (1)(a) were not 
fulfilled. In summary, the plaintiff can still demand payment of the purchase price in accordance 
with Art. 53.
Then, the court considered the counterclaim of the defendant. In the present case, the defendant 
himself remedied the defects at his own expenses. For this reason, the defendant could possibly 
have a claim for reimbursement under Art. 45 (1)(b), (2), 74. The court held that, in general, the 
buyer himself can remedy the defect and thereafter claim the costs. 
Having said that, in case of the 2001 sales contract, the plaintiff did not undertake an attempt to 
remedy the defect. By performing the rectification by himself, the defendant  could have violated the 
plaintiff’s right to remedy the defect. Art. 48 (1) gives the seller such right under certain 
circumstances. However, the court stated that Art. 48 (1) requires the seller to inform the buyer 
about his intention and willingness to remedy the defect. Such duty is not explicitly laid down in 
Art. 48 (1). However, such obligation can be derived from the general principle of good faith in Art. 
7 (1). In the case of the 2001 sales contract, the plaintiff did not inform the buyer at all if he intends 




Lastly, the court considered whether the set-off of the claim is governed by the Convention. The 
court held that when both claims arise from the same transaction governed by the CISG, they  can be 
offset against each other.
The court decided that the plaintiff could successfully claim payment of the purchase price under 
Art. 53. However, the defendant could claim reimbursement for the incurred costs of the remedy of 
the defects in accordance with Art. 45 (1)(b), (2), 74. 
7.4.2 Analysis of the Verdict in Light of Art. 7
The case at hand deals with two legal main issues: The requirements of a fundamental breach under 
Art. 25 and the prerequisite of the right of the seller to remedy the defect under Art. 48 (1). The 
remarks on Art. 25 do not contain observations with regard to the principle of good faith. 
Notwithstanding, this analysis will cover the remarks on the fundamental breach in detail in order to 
determine whether the principles of internationality  and the autonomous interpretation is violated or 
not. 
7.4.2.1 Fundamental Breach under Art. 25
In order for the defendant to declare avoidance of the contract under Art. 49 (1)(a), a fundamental 
breach of the contract is required. Condition of a fundamental breach is (inter alia) a substantial 
deprivation.203 The definition of the fundamental breach under Art. 25 is ‘less than precise.’204 The 
court observed that this definition needs further clarification. Eventually, it came to the conclusion 
that the substantial deprivation is not  only determined by the significance of the breach. In addition, 
it depends on whether the buyer is still interested in the contractual performance or not. The court 
derived this high standard to apply Art. 25 from the consideration that under the CISG the 
avoidance is the ultima ratio. The fact that  the Convention gives primacy  to the performance of 
contracts is widely recognised among scholars205 and courts.206 In conclusion, the German Federal 
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206 German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) VIII ZR 51/96, Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland 
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Supreme Court exclusively argues within the Convention. Additionally, it  quotes two foreign 
judgements in order to determine the requirements of a fundamental breach.207 In summary, it has to 
be concluded that the German Federal Supreme Court pays particular attention to the principles of 
internationality and autonomous interpretation. 
7.4.2.2 The Seller’s Right to Remedy the Defect under Art. 48 (1)
The defendant claimed reimbursement for the incurred costs of the remedy of the defects under Art. 
45 (1)(b), (2), 74. As depicted above, the defendant could have violated the plaintiff’s right to 
remedy the defect with regard to the 2001 sales contract. Art. 48 (1) states the seller’s right to cure 
the breach when certain requirements are fulfilled. The court held that Art. 48 (1) requires the seller 
to give notice of his intention to remedy the defect. From the wording of Art. 48 (1) such 
requirement cannot be inferred. However, the court derives such prerequisite from the principle of 
good faith. It has to be noted that in this case a positive duty is derived from the principle of good 
faith. However, as depicted in detail in chapter 6.3, good faith is to be understood as a general 
substantive principle in the CISG. As such, the principle is suitable to impose positive duties. The 
seller’s notification obligation under Art.48 (1) is widely recognised by scholars.208 They  argue that 
the buyer is left with the uncertainty if the seller will cure the breach or not. This uncertainty  for the 
buyer can easily be decreased without putting a major strain on the seller.209
The recognition of good faith as a general principle in accordance with Art.7(2) is used to expand 
the application. It should be noted, however, that the court  does not apply good faith as a 
substantive doctrine in a strict dogmatic way. The prevailing view among scholars applies the 
substantive principle of good faith via Art. 7 (2).210
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7.4.2.2 Is the Setoff Claim Governed by the Convention?
Lastly, it should be analysed whether the setoff against a claim is governed by the CISG or not. 
Once more, this subject does not deal with the principle of good faith. However, again it  has to be 
determined if the court’s decision is in line with the principles of internationality  and autonomous 
interpretation.
The question whether a setoff claim is governed by the Convention is a well-known controversy 
and was content of many court decisions.211 To begin with, it is clear that the set-off is not expressly 
governed by the CISG.212 At the same time, this does not automatically mean that it is excluded 
from the Convention.
Some courts believe that setoff claims are not governed by the Convention and therefore are to be 
determined by domestic law.213 The main argument for this view is that this issue was not addressed 
during the drafting process of the CISG.214
On the other hand, some courts argue that where both claims arise from the same transaction 
governed by the CISG, they can be offset against each other.215
In the case at hand, the German Federal Supreme Court sets forth both views but favours the latter 
approach. The court  argues that the general principles provide sufficient  basis to deal with setoff 
claims. Additionally, Art. 81 (2), 84 (2) and 88 (3) deal with similar situations. Once again, the court 
refers back to previous court decisions.216 In summary, the court once more pays particular attention 
to the principles of internationality and autonomous interpretation. 
In conclusion, the remarks by the court are comprehensible and suitable to be recognised by the 
courts of foreign member states. Therefore, this decision by the German Federal Supreme Court 
applies the principles set out in Art.7(1) in an exemplary manner.
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7.5 Case 5: High Court Koblenz (Oberlandesgericht Koblenz) 2 U 108/13
7.5.1 Abstract
The plaintiff (the ‘seller’) is an Italian producer of natural stone tiles. The plaintiff concluded a 
contract with the German defendant (the ‘buyer’) for the sale of natural stone tiles. The defendant 
claimed that the tiles contained incorrect calibrations and therefore did not conform to the contract. 
Notwithstanding, the defendant installed 80% of the natural stone tiles in a sample space. Upon 
completion of the sample, the defendant discarded the tiles. The seller claimed payment of the 
purchase price under Art. 53 before the court. He argued that the buyer’s notice of defects was 
unsubstantiated.
To begin with, the High Court found that the sales contract at hand is governed by the CISG. 
In general, the court held that after delivery of the goods the seller was entitled to claim payment of 
the purchase price in accordance with Art. 53, 58 (1). The court  stressed that the CISG does not 
explicitly contain the right to suspend the payment of the purchase price in the case of defective 
performance. Having said that, the court considered the option of an external gap-filling in 
accordance with Art.7 (2). The court, however, argued that this question is irrelevant if the 
defendant does not have a claim for substitute delivery in the present case which would be the 
ground for a right of retention. Therefore, the court eventually left the question if a right of retention 
exists with the aid of external gap-filling unanswered.
For this reason, the court then considered the possibility  of a claim for substitute delivery  under Art.
46 (2):
Firstly, such claim requires a defect under Art.35. Therefore, the court determined whether the 
natural stone tiles did conform to the contract or not. The court expressed its doubts on whether the 
deviation had the significance to constitute an unconformity with the contract. In conclusion, the 
court held that it is ultimately irrelevant for the present case whether the tiles do conform with the 
contract or not. For this reason, said question was not answered by the court.
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Secondly, the claim for substitute delivery requires the notification of the defect in accordance with 
Art. 38, 39. In this context, the court addressed the question if the buyer had given notice of the 
defects within reasonable time. As described in detail in case 3, the buyer is obliged to examine the 
goods in as short  as time as is practicable under the circumstances (Art. 38). In addition, Art. 39 
states that the buyer loses the right to rely on the lack of conformity  if he does notify the seller 
within reasonable time after he (ought to have) discovered the defect. The court expressed its 
doubts whether the notice nine days after delivery was still within reasonable time. It came to the 
conclusion that the defendant eventually failed to give notification within reasonable time. Once 
again, however, the court stated that this question ultimately is irrelevant for the present case.
Even if the notification would have been given in time, the defendant’s claim of substitute delivery 
would have been unjustified:
The conduct of the defendant led to a waive of his claim for subsequent delivery. In light of the 
principle of good faith, one cannot install and discard 80% of the goods and thereafter demand on 
subsequent delivery. The court held that such behaviour contradicts the principle of venire contra 
factum proprium which is derived from Art.7 (1). 
Therefore, the defendant has no claim for substitute delivery under Art. 46 (2). As a consequence, 
the defendant has, in any case, no right of retention. Thus, the plaintiff’s claim for payment of the 
purchase price under Art. 53 is justified.
7.5.2 Analysis of the Verdict in Light of Art. 7
The case at hand contains two main legal subjects: On the one hand, it  deals with the question 
whether the tool of external gap-filling under Art. 7 (2) opens the Convention up to a right of 
retention. On the other hand, the court applies the good faith principle with respect to the right of 
substitute delivery. 
Firstly, with regard to the remarks on the right of retention the High Court outlines that the 
Convention does not recognise the right to suspend their own performance after defective delivery 
of the other party. The CISG only sets forth the conditions under which a party can suspend their 
performance before the goods were delivered (Art. 71). Therefore, the court considered the option 
of a right to suspend a party’s own performance through external gap-filling under Art.7 (2) via 
domestic law. Eventually, the court did not provide any answer to whether the defendant could 
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suspend the payment of the purchase price or not. In summary, the court applied the CISG 
autonomously. This can not be taken for granted, since the German domestic law recognises a right 
of retention in such cases.217 
Secondly, and this is the essence of the case, the court applied the principle of good faith. As 
depicted above, the court held that it is contradicting behaviour to notify  the seller about a defect in 
the first place. And then, install most of the goods only  to discard it  afterwards. Such behaviour, the 
court stated, contradicts the venire contra factum proprium principle. In this case, the court uses 
good faith as a principle of interpretation. Once again, the court does not apply the principle in a 
strict dogmatic way  (which would be the application via Art.7 (2)). Nevertheless, the court’s 
remarks are perfectly  in line with the ‘spirit’ of the Convention: As depicted earlier, Articles 8 (3) 
and 16 (2)(b) recognise the venire contra factum proprium principle. In addition, the court 
exclusively  refers to the Convention. Therefore, it  can be said that the court preserves the principles 
of internationality  and autonomous interpretation. All things considered, the court’s decision is 
perfectly in line with the principles set out in Art.7 (1).
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7.6 Case 6: High Court Hamm (Oberlandesgericht Hamm) 13 U 102/01 
7.6.1 Abstract
The defendant is German defendant (the ‘seller’) of computer memory modules. On 3 January 
2000, the Chinese plaintiff (the ‘buyer’) and the seller agreed on the purchase of these memory 
modules by phone. The order was then confirmed by fax. The seller agreed to deliver the goods ‘as 
soon as possible’. Before this order, the involved parties had been having prior business 
relationships. On 5 January  2000, the seller performed the order by handing the memory modules to 
a carrier. Subsequently, the goods arrived at the buyer’s storage facilities on 7 January. At the same 
day, however, the buyer sent  a cancellation fax to the seller and returned the goods to the customs 
warehouse of the carrier.
Later, the parties reached a partial settlement that obliged the buyer to accept delivery and pay the 
purchase price partially. Before the court, the seller claimed payment of the remaining purchase 
price plus interests and reimbursement of his attorney’s fees. 
The buyer, however, argued that he successfully avoided the contract because of late delivery under 
Art. 49 (2)(a) or (b). For this reason, there was no basis for the claim of the purchase price in the 
present case. With regard to the late delivery, the buyer went on to say that it was practice between 
the parties to delivery promptly. 
The seller replied that the sales contract was still in effect because there was no agreement on a 
strict time limit for performance. Certainly, in previous cases deliveries were effected on very short 
notice. That was, however, only possible because in previous cases the credit line was not fully 
utilised. Such credit line was concluded between the parties in favour of the buyer. In the instant 
case the buyer owed payment of the purchase price from a previous contract. Therefore, the credit 
line was fully  utilised. Delivery was only  made after the purchase price from the previous contract 
was settled which was on 4 January 2000.
The High Court held that the CISG governed the legal relations between the parties. Under the 
CISG, the parties orally concluded a contract on 3 January 2000 which concluded the condition to 
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deliver the goods ‘as soon as possible’. A sales contract may be concluded in any form in 
accordance with Art. 11. 
Then, the court  addressed the question whether the buyer had successfully  avoided the contract 
under Art. 49 (2) or not. The court quoted Art. 33 (a) which states that  the time for effecting 
delivery must be derived from the interpretation of the contract. Therefore, one has to interpret the 
intent of the parties in accordance with Art. 8. The wording of the agreed ‘as soon as possible’ was 
vague. One could not determine the exact time for effective delivery from such wording. However, 
the parties ‘are bound by [...] any practices which they have established between themselves’ in 
accordance with Art. 9 (1).218 Previous deliveries had been performed the latest at the following 
day. Such practice applied to the present contract under Art.9 (1). For this reason, the court found 
that the seller was obliged to perform the delivery of the memory modules ‘at the latest at  the 
following day of the written order’.219 
However, the buyer may not rely  on the delayed delivery. The buyer acknowledged that delivery 
would only be made after the previous purchase price was settled and the granted credit line was not 
fully  utilised. It was up to the buyer to create the prerequisite for a timely  delivery. Therefore, the 
buyer acted contrary  to his previous behaviour by avoiding the contract because of delayed delivery. 
Such behaviour violates the venire contra factum proprium principle which is derived from the 
good faith principle stated in Art.7 (1).
For this reason, the contract was not avoided under Art. 49 (2)(a) or (b). As a consequence, the 
buyer is obliged to pay the remaining purchase price in accordance with Art. 53. Moreover, the 
claim for reimbursement of the seller’s attorney’s fee is justified under Art. 61(1)(b), 74. Lastly, the 
seller is also entitled to claim interests in accordance with Art. 78.
7.6.2 Analysis of the Verdict in Light of Good Faith
The main issue of the present case is if the buyer can avoid the contract under Art. 49 (2). To begin 
with, the court states that the delivery  is indeed delayed. However, the court decided that the seller 
may not rely on the delayed delivery with regard to the venire contra factum proprium principle. 
This principle is derived from the doctrine of good faith. It is, as described earlier, applicable in 
cases where a party’s behaviour is contradictory to its previous conduct. In the present case, the 
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court’s argument in favour of the application of this principle is easy to follow: It would be 
unreasonable to expect delivery of the goods with the consequence to exceed the granted credit line. 
Hence, it was reasonable to wait  until the payment from the previous purchase contract was settled. 
Therefore, it  was the buyer who was responsible for the delay. The following avoidance of the 
contract on basis of the delayed delivery contradicted the previous behaviour. As mentioned earlier, 
the venire contra factum proprium principle is well-established within the CISG. It is found in Art. 
8 (3) and 16 (2)(b). Therefore, it is widely  recognised to be a general expression of good faith in the 
Convention.220 Additionally, it has to be said that the court applies the Convention in accordance 
with the principles of internationality and uniformity. All in all, the court’s decision is perfectly in 
line with the principles set out in Art. 7 (1).
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7.7 Case 7: Geneva Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp. v Barr Laboratories, Inc., et al. 
US Court of the Southern District of New York 98 Civ. 861, 99 Civ. 3607
7.7.1 Abstract
The Canadian defendant produces a chemical substance (clathrate) for the manufacture of a 
medication (warfarin sodium). The plaintiff is an American pharmaceutical company that desired 
the production of such warfarin sodium. Therefore the plaintiff requested samples of the chemical 
substance from the defendant. The defendant supplied the plaintiff with the samples and confirmed 
that it would support the plaintiff’s application for approval by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA). Hence, the defendant confirmed to the FDA that  it would supply the plaintiff with the 
chemical substance. 
However, shortly  after the defendant concluded an exclusively agreement about the supply of 
clathrate with a third party. That  contract would have been violated if the defendant were to proceed 
with the sale of the chemical substance to the plaintiff.
After the FDA gave permission for the production of the medication, the plaintiff submitted an 
order for the purchase of clathrate. The defendant refused such purchase order. 
The plaintiff claims that, under the CISG, a contract  for the sale of clathrate was concluded. By 
refusing to supply, the plaintiff states, the defendant violated the agreement and should be liable. 
The plaintiff argues that according to industry practice a contract was already concluded when the 
defendant agreed to support the plaintiff’s application for approval by the FDA. 
The Court  of the District of New York found that the alleged purchase contract in the instant case 
was governed by  the CISG. Therefore, the general rules on the formation of the contract Art. 14 and 
18 are applicable. Subsequently, an agreement is concluded by offer and agreement of the 
contracting parties. According to Art. 14, for a proposal to be considered as an offer it must be 
‘sufficiently definite’ and it must indicate an intent to be bound.
The court also recognised Art. 9 which states that usages and industry  practices are automatically 
incorporated to an agreement, unless otherwise agreed. The court held that  there was indeed the 
industry ‘custom and the understanding of both the manufacturer and the supplier that, upon the 
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issuance of the Notice of Compliance, the supplier will supply the product.’ In addition, the offer 
also met the requirements of definiteness as the good was to be indicated as clathrate in commercial 
quantities. In conclusion, the court stated, the conditions of an offer were fulfilled. With regard to 
the acceptance of the offer the court applied Art. 18 (3). Art. 18 (3) refers to the conduct  of the 
parties:
‘The offeree [...] indicate assent by performing an act’.221 In the case at hand, the court held that by 
sending the reference letter to the FDA and supplying the plaintiff with samples the defendant 
accepted the offer by conduct. Therefore, the plaintiff’s offer was accepted by the defendant. 
Accordingly, a sales contract was concluded. 
The court explicitly stressed that it interpreted the statements and conduct of the parties with regard 
to the concept of good faith. According to the court, ‘CISG Art. 7(1) embodies a liberal approach to 
contract formation and interpretation, and a strong preference for enforcing obligations [...].’
Lastly, the court also briefly also considered claims under US (state) law. These claims, however, 
were either preempted by the CISG or – in the case of tort claims – the requirements were not met.
In summary, a sales contract between the plaintiff and the defendant was concluded. By not 
supplying the plaintiff with clathrate, the defendant violated the contract. The defendant therefore 
owes performance to the plaintiff.
7.7.2 Analysis of the decision in light of Art. 7(1)
In the instant case, the main doubt concerned the formation of the contract. In this respect, it  was 
noteworthy  that the court chose a liberal approach towards the interpretation of the statements and 
the conduct of the parties. Those were interpreted widely. This is motivated, as the court stated, by 
the principle of good faith which is laid down in Art. 7 (1). According to the court, the principle of 
good faith puts emphasis on industry customs and shows a ‘strong preference for enforcing 
obligations.’
On first  glance, the court’s application of good faith does not appear particularly noteworthy: The 
court used good faith as a tool of interpretation. This use of good faith is explicitly stated in Art.7 
(1). The court refers to good faith explicitly  as a ‘general principle’. This is, however, nowadays 
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generally  accepted and therefore not  particularly remarkable. Having said that, when studied more 
closely, the court’s ruling becomes more interesting. One has to bear in mind that neither the CISG 
nor the American law recognise the so-called culpa in contrahendo doctrine which is derived from 
the good faith principle.222 The culpa in contrahendo doctrine imposes the duty  to negotiate with 
care. As a consequence, a party can be held liable for the expectations it created during the 
negotiations. The German Civil Code codified the culpa in contrahendo doctrine in section 311 
GCC. Under the German Civil Code, the plaintiff could most likely successfully claim 
reimbursement against the defendant subject  to section 311 GCC. In the case at hand, however, the 
court comes to a similar result by assuming that the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant 
was concluded at a very early stage. The court uses the good faith principle and the industry 
practice to apply Art. 14 very widely. 
Art. 14 requires an offer to be ‘sufficiently definite’. In the present case, it is at  least questionable if 
the proposal by the plaintiff complies this requirement. For a proposal to be considered an offer 
under Art. 14, it needs to indicate the goods as well as the quantity and the purchase prince.223 
Although the good can clearly  be identified as clathrate and the purchase price was also agreed, it 
remains unclear if the term ‘industrial quantities’ are sufficiently  specified. It is, however, doubted 
that the similar amount of ‘a larger quantity’ meets the specificity  requirement.224  All things 
considered, the court applied Art. 14 – in light of the good faith principle – very widely with the 
objective to hold the defendant liable for the created expectations. Noteworthily, by creating a 
contractual link between the parties the court imposed obligations to the parties that exceed the 
duties under the culpa in contrahendo doctrine: Under the culpa in contrahendo doctrine the 
defendant would not owe performance but merely reimbursement. 
Lastly, one has to question if the decision of the court is in line with the principles of 
internationality and uniformity stated in Art. 7 (1). Following these principles, it  can be derived that 
the application of domestic rules and principles is the avoided. In the instant  case, the court applies 
good faith in a way  that exceeds the way good faith is used in American law. For instance, as 
mentioned earlier, the good faith duty under the UCC only refers to the performance and not to the 
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formation of the contract.225 Actually, the court finds its decision exclusively within the Convention. 
As to domestic claims, the court held that the CISG mostly preempted such claims. 
The decision of the court is therefore perfectly in line with the principle of internationality  which is 
widely  understood as a call for the courts to seek for solutions that are likely to be recognised by the 
courts of other member states.226  In conclusion, the court did not violate the principles of 
internationality and uniformity.
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7.8 Case 8: TeeVee Toons, Inc. & Steve Gottlieb, Inc. v Gerhard Schubert GmbH
US Court of the Southern District of New York 00 Civ. 5189 (RCC)
7.8.1 Abstract
The plaintiff (‘the buyer’) is a US-company that  developed and produced the so-called ‘Biobox’ 
which is an environmental friendly box for packaging cassettes. The defendant (‘the seller’) is a 
German manufacturer of packaging machinery. In February 1995, the seller and the buyer 
concluded a contract for the sale of a production system for the Biobox. In the sequel, the 
construction process of the packaging machinery was delayed by two years. Furthermore, after the 
packaging plant was finally delivered in August 1997, it often malfunctioned. The buyer notified 
the seller about these issues in the course of October 1997. The plaintiff claimed reimbursement for 
the sustained damages and lost profit before the court.
The New York Southern District Court found that the CISG is applicable in the present case. 
Therefore, basis of the claim by the buyer was Art. 74, 35. First requirement of such claim is the 
existence of a defect in accordance with Art. 35. The court held that the plant was not fit for its 
ordinary and particular purpose and therefore defect under Art. 35(2)(a)-(b). 
Then, the court addressed the issue whether the buyer met the notification criteria set in Art. 38, 39. 
As described in an earlier case, the buyer loses the right to rely on the lack of conformity if he does 
not notify the seller within reasonable time after he discovered the defect.227 The court found the 
two-month period between delivery and notification reasonable. As a consequence, the court stated, 
the notification was timely. 
The seller argued that the terms and conditions attached to the sales agreement included a 
disclaimer of warranties. The buyer, however, brought up  that the parties orally agreed that such 
clause of the terms and conditions would not apply to the agreed sales contract. 
With regard to this issue, the court stated that the terms and conditions are only effective if both 
parties intended it to be part of the contract  at  the time of the conclusion of the contract. Therefore, 
one has to interpret the intent of the parties’ statements in accordance with Art. 8. Additionally, one 
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must interpret the intent in light of ‘the general principles upon which [the CISG] is based.’228 The 
court further stated that ‘it often happens that parties use standard form contracts [...] to which they 
pay no attention such that [a] rule under which such a clause would always prevent a party from 
invoking prior statements or undertakings would be too rigid and often lead to results which were 
contrary to good faith.’ The court stressed that ‘the notion of good faith in international trade must 
underlie any CISG interpretation.’
Eventually, the court decided that at the time of the conclusion of the contract, the buyer’s 
subjective intent was not to include the standard terms. For this reason, the seller could not  rely on 
the disclaimer of warranties.
Lastly, the court noted that the foreseeability  requirement under Art. 74 was identical to that 
provided by US law. Therefore, the court  referred to US case law as a guideline. In conclusion, the 
court decided that the damage (including the lost profit) was foreseeable. The court decided that the 
buyer’s claim for reimbursement of the damages under Art. 35, 74 was justified.
7.8.2 Analysis of the Verdict in Light of Art. 7 (1)
There are three remarks of the New York Southern District Court that are worth taking a closer look 
at. To begin with, the court held that the notification of the defect two months after delivery  was 
timely. Art. 39 (1) simply states that notice is to be given ‘within a reasonable time.’229 Such term is 
indefinite and therefore requires further clarification. Having said that, the court found the two-
month period between delivery and notification reasonable without any further remarks. However, 
the idea behind the provision of Art. 39 is to give the seller the opportunity  to review and verify  a 
claimed damage.230 Hence, it is widely  accepted among scholars231 and by civil law courts232 that 
the buyer is obliged to carry out test  performances of the goods. This being said, the two-month 
notification period after delivery appears at least inappropriately long.
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Then, one has to take a look at the court’s remarks with regard to the issue whether the terms and 
conditions, which included a disclaimer of warranties, became part of the contractual agreement. As 
depicted above, the court interpreted the parties’ intentions with particular regard to the principle of 
good faith. The use of good faith as a tool of interpretation is explicitly stated in Art. 7 (1) and 
therefore not very controversial. It  should be noted that the court applies good faith with regard to 
the interpretation of the parties’ intent. Some scholars take the view that good faith is limited to its 
application as a tool of interpretation exclusively  in relation to the Convention.233  However, as 
described earlier, the prevailing view among scholars and courts applies good faith with regard to 
the intent and conduct of the parties as well.
Lastly, the court  decided if the damage was foreseeable which is required under Art. 74. The court 
held that the foreseeability prerequisite is identical to the one under US law. For this reason, the 
court referred to the English case Hadley v Baxendale234  and the US case Delchi Carrier SpA v 
Rotorex Corp.235  These references contravene the principles of international and autonomous 
interpretation of the Convention under Art. 7 (1). The reference to domestic law is the ultima ratio. 
Even though the requirement of foreseeability  is identical to the requirement in the Convention, the 
CISG is to be interpreted out of itself. In conclusion, the court violated Art.7 (1).
61
233 See Chapter 6.3 ‘The Observance of Good Faith in International Trade’
234 Hadley v. Baxendale, [1854] EWHC J70
235 Delchi Carrier SpA v Rotorex Corp 71 F.3d 1024, 1995
7.9 Case 9: Downs Investments Pty Ltd v Perjawa Steel SDN BHD, Supreme Court of 
Queensland (10680/1996) 
7.9.1 Abstract
The plaintiff (the ‘seller’) is an Australian iron trading company. The seller entered into a contract 
with the Malaysian defendant (the ‘buyer’) for the purchase and shipment of scrap steel. The parties 
agreed inter alia that the buyer was obliged to provide an irrevocable letter of credit prior the 
shipment. In the sequel, the management structure of the buyer changed. Under this new 
management structure, the buyer needed permission from an executive committee before it could 
provide the letter of credit. The executive committee, however, could not communicate any 
instructions within a short period of time. For this reason, the buyer failed to provide the letter of 
credit. As a consequence, the seller terminated the contract. For the purpose of the shipment of the 
scrap steel, the seller leased a vessel at  his expense. In addition, the seller had to store the scrap 
steel at his own expense The seller claimed reinbursement for the incurred costs before the court.
The Supreme Court of Queensland held that basis for the seller’s claim was Art. 74, 75 because the 
contractual agreement between the parties was governed by the CISG. Art. 74, 75 require the 
avoidance of the contract. In accordance with Art. 64 the seller was permitted to declare the 
avoidance of the contract if the buyer failed to perform any of his obligations that amounted to a 
fundamental breach of the contract. For this reason, the court addressed the issue whether the failure 
to provide the letter of credit constitutes a fundamental breach under Art. 25 or not. In the court’s 
view, the buyer’s ‘failure to establish a letter of credit in the circumstances of the case was a failure 
by the buyer to meet his obligation to pay the price of the goods’.236 The court argued with the 
wording of Art. 54, which states that  the obligation to pay  the price ‘includes taking such steps and 
complying with such formalities as may be required under the contract’.237  Therefore, the court 
found that the issue of the letter of notice was a primary obligation of the buyer. The breach against 
the obligation constituted a fatal violation of the contractual agreement. Having said that, the court 
also addressed the question whether the seller had to show consideration for the new management 
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structure with regard to the principle of good faith or not. However, the court concluded that the 
‘required executive management committee approval for a letter of credit, and the refusal of the 
committee was held to be no excuse at law’.238 Therefore, the failure to provide a timely letter of 
credit was a fundamental breach of the contract under Art. 25. 
Lastly, the court addressed the question whether the plaintiff fulfilled his duty to mitigate the 
damage in accordance with Art. 77. The plaintiff sold the scrap steel to another buyer within two 
months. In the court’s view, this satisfied the mitigation duty  under Art. 77. In conclusion, the court 
decided that the seller’s claim for reimbursement of the sustained costs was justified under Art.74, 
75.
7.9.2 Analysis of the Verdict in Light of Art. 7 (1)
Main issue of the instant case was the application of the fundamental breach under Art. 25 in a 
situation where the parties included additional obligations to the sales contract. In this context, the 
court had to determine how much importance the parties attributed to the additional obligation at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract. The requirement of a fundamental breach can only be 
fulfilled if the additional obligation was of significance to the parties. The court used the wording of 
Art. 54 to come to the conclusion that the issue of the letter of notice was a ‘primary obligation.’ 
The court argues within the Convention. Therefore, the court’s arguments respect the principles of 
internationality and autonomous interpretation under Art.7 (1). Then, the court considered the 
question whether the seller had to show consideration for the new management structure with 
regard to the principle of good faith. In this context, the court uses good faith as some kind of 
corrective measure. However, the remarks of the court stay vague. It is unclear if the court 
considered the option to impose a duty of considerateness. This would be remarkable, since 
common law jurisdictions do not derive such duties from the concept of good faith.239 The CISG, 
however, recognises good faith as a substantive doctrine from which generally duties of 
considerateness can be derived.240 If this is the way the remarks of the court  are to be understood, 
this would be the only case – discussed in this thesis – that considers the application of good faith in 
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a way that exceeds the domestic understanding of good faith. Having said that, the court eventually 
does not apply  good faith as a corrective measure. It  would have been interesting to see some more 
detailed remarks by the court with regard to the application of good faith. In conclusion, one can 
simply state that the court preserves all of the principle laid down in Art. 7(1).
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7.10 Case 10: Castel Electronics Pty v Toshiba Singapore Pte Ltd, Federal Court of Australia 
(1080/2010)
7.10.1 Abstract
The plaintiff (the ‘buyer’) is an Australian distributor for electronic devices. The defendant (the 
‘seller’) is a manufacturer of electronic products incorporated in Singapore. The parties concluded a 
contract of distributorship  of so-called set-top boxes which the defendant produced. Set-top  boxes 
are electronic devices that convert  digital signals onto analogue television receivers. After the 
resale, the plaintiff received many customer complaints. It became apparent that the set-top  boxes 
did not comply with the contractual agreed conditions. As a consequence, the buyer claimed 
reimbursement for the incurred damages before the court under Art. 74. The seller, however, denied 
the claims. In particular with regard to the amount of damages, the defendant claimed that Art. 74 
was limited to the damages the defendant  ‘foresaw’. Therefore, in any case the claim was limited to 
a much smaller amount than the amount demanded by the plaintiff. 
Firstly, the Federal Court of Australia confirmed the application of the CISG. Secondly, the court 
held that  the set-top  boxes did not conform to the contractual agreed terms. Therefore, they were 
defective under Art. 35. Then, the court confirmed the existence of the further prerequisites of Art. 
74. Lastly, the court considered the objection of the seller that the claim under Art. 74 was limited to 
the amount which the defendant foresaw. The court  stated that Art. 74 refers to the ‘to consequences 
which [are], objectively  speaking, foreseeable by  the breaching party.’241 For this reason, one has to 
ask whether a reasonable party  in the same situation could expect the loss from its non-
performance. In this context, a reasonable considerations of a party have to be viewed in light of the 
principle of good faith under Art. 7 (1). As a consequence, the court concluded that it was 
foreseeable at the time of the conclusion of each of the relevant sales contracts that  ‘failures, recalls 
and delays in supplying replacements of the [...] products would have had a repercussive effect in 
reducing [the distributor’s] margins of profit’.242  In conclusion, the limitation of damages with 
regard to the foreseeability under Art. 74 had no impact on the amount of the reimbursement. The 
plaintiff’s claim was successful.
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7.10.2 Analysis of the Verdict in Light of Art. 7
This case only briefly mentions the principle of good faith as a tool to interpretation of the 
Convention. In addition, the court used good faith to specify a term within the CISG and not to 
interpret the party’s conduct. This use of good faith is explicitly stated in Art. 7 (1). Therefore, the 
application of the court is quite beyond dispute. It  is noteworthy, however, that the court refers to 
the ‘principle of good faith’ and not explicitly to Art. 7 (1). These remarks by no means violate any 
of the principles set out in Art. 7 (1). However, these remarks do make it less appealing to foreign 
courts to refer to the judgement, since they  stay vague and broad. Notwithstanding, also the 
principles of internationality and autonomous interpretation are preserved.
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8. Conclusion
As depicted earlier, Art. 7 (1) contains three principles of interpretation: the internationality, the 
autonomous interpretation and the observance of good faith. One has to bear in mind that the 
principle of autonomous interpretation was of special importance to the drafters of the Convention 
For this reason, they tried to use a plain language – a so-called ‘lingua franca’ – where is was 
possible. With regard to good faith, however, the opposite is the case: most domestic legal systems 
have their own understanding of good faith. Therefore, as depicted in earlier chapters, the scope and 
content of good faith under Art. 7 (1) was (and is) subject of ongoing discussions among scholars 
and courts.
This section summarises the essential findings of the cases. Thereafter, this chapter will draw 
conclusions on how the application of good faith under Art.7 (1) differs in Germany, Australia and 
the District of New York. Particular attention is paid on whether the application of good faith is in 
line with Art. 7’s two accompanying principles (internationality and autonomous interpretation) or 
not.
Noteworthily, with the exception of case 1, all German court decisions contained the venire contra 
factum proprium principle which is derived from the good faith doctrine. In case 2, 3 and 6 the 
court applied the principle with the consequence that a party cannot rely on a right because it would 
contradict its previous behaviour. In case 4 and 5 the courts imposed an additional unwritten 
obligation with regard to good faith under Art. 7 (1). In all of these cases, the court applied good 
faith as a substantive principle. In case 1, which is the only  case where the venire contra factum 
proprium doctrine is not applied, the court uses good faith as a tool of interpretation. This use is the 
original approach of good faith which can be directly derived from the wording of Art. 7 (1). In this 
case, however, the court derives the positive duty to attach the terms and conditions to the contract 
from such interpretation. Therefore, once again, the court eventually  applies good faith as a 
substantive doctrine. As a result, one can conclude that all selected German cases apply good faith 
as a substantive principle. 
There are a few more aspects one should note from the selected German cases: To begin with, the 
prevailing view among scholars is that good faith – as a substantive principle – is to be applied via 
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Art. 7 (2).243  The wording of Art. 7 (1) and the legislative history do not leave room for a direct 
application of good faith as a substantive principle via Art. 7 (1). Contrarily, none of the courts 
follow this approach. Of course, one can argue that  courts often choose more pragmatic and less 
dogmatic approaches. Nevertheless, it  should be noted that the courts did not apply good faith via 
Art. 7 (2). In fact, the author of this thesis is not aware of any CISG cases of the three countries 
where a court applies the substantive principle of good faith via Art. 7 (2). 
Then, it appears that specific case groups emerged from the principle of good faith. For instance, 
the duty  to attach the terms and conditions to the contract (case 1) was applied in several 
(international) court decisions.244 Same applies – to a lesser extend – to the application of good faith 
in the cases 2, 3 and 4. There are as well decisions on the elimination of the requirement of 
avoidance of the contract under Art. 74 when the seller ultimately and seriously  refused to perform 
(case 2).245 There are as well cases that deal with the notification under Art. 38, 39 in light of good 
faith. In addition, there are quite a few cases where the courts imposed the duty for the seller to 
notify  the buyer about his intention to remedy the defects under Art. 48 (case 4).246 Noteworthily, all 
of these similar cases come from civil law jurisdictions. However, that does not mean that the courts 
– with one exception – violated the principles of international and autonomous application of the 
Convention. As depicted above, the venire contra factum proprium doctrine is well established 
within the CISG. The venire contra factum principle is the underlying principle of Art. 8 (3) and 16 
(2) (b). Therefore, it is widely recognised to be a general expression of good faith in the 
Convention. In case 1, the court derives the duty to attach the terms and conditions from the 
principles of cooperation and loyalty, which stem from the good faith doctrine. As shown earlier, 
both are found in Art. 32 (3) and 60 (a). They are therefore recognised as standard of conduct within 
the Convention.
However, there is one exception among the German cases. In case 3, the High Court Karlsruhe as 
well as German Federal Supreme Court violated the principles of internationality and autonomous 
interpretation under Art. 7 (1). In this case, the courts decided on whether it is contradictory 
behaviour not to mention the buyer’s failure to meet the notification duty under Art. 38, 39 and then 
rely  on it before the court. Both courts referred to case law regarding a similar provision under the 
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German Commercial Code. As depicted earlier, the reference to domestic law is to be avoided. In 
fact, it is the ultima ratio. In case 3, the courts could and should have referred to foreign court 
decisions in similar cases.247  On this basis, they could have developed criteria without explicitly 
referring to German case law. In referring to German case law, however, the courts violated the 
principles of internationality and autonomous interpretation of the Convention. 
The Australian case Downs Investments Pty Ltd v Perjawa Steel SDN BHD (case 10) is eye-
catching. In this case, the court defines the fundamental breach under Art. 25. Then, in the end, the 
court considers applying good faith as a corrective measure. It raises the question whether a duty to 
show consideration for the other parties’ new ‘management structure’ exists. Unfortunately, the 
court’s remarks in this section stay vague. Therefore, one can only  speculate if the court considered 
applying good faith as a corrective measure. 
It is, however, to be noted that Australia does not use good faith as a corrective measure on a 
domestic level. For this reason, such application would exceed the domestic understanding of good 
faith. Since the CISG recognises such use of good faith, this decision is a potential role model for 
the application of the Convention apart  from domestic understanding – a role model in the 
application of the principles of internationality and autonomous interpretation.
Contrarily, Castel Electronics Pty v Toshiba Singapore Pte Ltd (case 9) is not extremely exciting: In 
this case, the court  only uses good faith as a tool of interpretation. The court  applies good faith in 
order to define the requirement of foreseeability under Art. 74. The use of good faith as a tool for 
interpretation is explicitly stated in the wording of Art. 7 (1).
In both American cases , the courts use good faith as a tool of interpretation. As described earlier, 
the use of good faith as a tool of interpretation can directly be derived from the wording and is 
therefore not exciting. However, in Geneva Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp. v Barr Laboratories 
(case 7), the New York Southern District Court applied good faith in order to determine whether a 
contract was concluded or not. In TeeVee Toons, Inc. & Steve Gottlieb, Inc. v Gerhard Schubert 
GmbH (case 8), the New York Southern District Court  applied good faith in order to determine 
whether terms and conditions became part of the contract or not. This is insofar remarkable as the 
UCC does not recognise good faith with regard to the formation of the contract. Good faith under 
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UCC only refers to the performance of the contract.248 Therefore, in both cases the applied scope of 
good faith exceeds the understanding of good faith under domestic law. Hence, both decisions can 
be regarded as stellar examples of the autonomous interpretation of the CISG.
Apart from the findings in the common law cases, one should bear in mind that the common law 
jurisdictions applied good faith to a much smaller extend than Germany  or other civil law 
jurisdictions. On the one hand, there are a total of 544 German decisions in the PACE database from 
which 23 apply  good faith according to the search form.249  On the other hand, there are 304 US 
cases from which 6 apply  good faith. Admittedly, the search form is inaccurate but it is at least an 
indicator of the general application of good faith under Art. 7 (1). However, it should not be 
forgotten that  the United States are one of the common law countries that  lean more towards the use 
of the good faith principle.250 Therefore, this impression is reinforced by a look at the application of 
good faith under the CISG in the United Kingdom and Australia. With regard to the United 
Kingdom, the author is not aware of any English litigation or arbitration case that applies good faith 
under the CISG. Moreover, the PACE database reflects only two Australian courts that  directly 
apply  good faith under the CISG. In conclusion one can state that German courts tend to apply  good 
faith under Art. 7 (1) much more often than courts from the selected common law jurisdictions.
Furthermore, German courts do not only  apply good faith more often, they  also have a way more 
offensive approach towards the application of good faith. As described above, in five of the six 
cases the courts applied good faith as a general principle. It should be recalled that during the 
Vienna Conference it were for the most part civil law delegates that argued for a general principle 
of good faith.251  In contrast, the common law courts exclusively  applied good faith as a tool of 
interpretation.252  Their representatives were in favour of leaving good faith out of the CISG.253 
Also, as shown earlier, German law has a more generous approach towards the application of good 
faith. 254 Therefore, it can be argued that the jurisdiction’s approach towards good faith is reflected 
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by their court’s application of good faith. This holds true for the number of times good faith is 
applied as well as the way the doctrine is applied.
 
Lastly, it  should be noted that the German courts do not deviate from the use of good faith under 
domestic law. In all cases, the application of good faith corresponds to a case group that was 
developed under domestic law. It  seems as if the courts are oriented towards domestic case groups. 
In contrast, the New York District Courts applied good faith with regard to the formation of the 
contract. As depicted earlier, good faith is not applied in such way under the UCC. 
In summary, it can be said that  the courts applied good faith – with one exception – in line with the 
principles of internationality and autonomous interpretation under Art. 7 (1). However, as depicted 
above, there are differences in the application of good faith between the different jurisdictions. 
German courts apply  good faith more often and as a general principle while the selected common 
law jurisdictions apply  good faith to a lesser extend and less often. It can therefore be concluded 
that the domestic approach towards good faith influences the court’s application of good faith but 
not to the extend that the principle of autonomous interpretation of the Convention is violated. 
However, one main reason for the principles of internationality and autonomous interpretation of 
the CISG was the goal to achieve a uniform application of the Convention.255 Uniform application 
includes the avoidance of so-called forum shopping. Forum shopping means ‘choosing a forum 
with jurisprudence more favourable to one of the parties.’256  Since the courts apply good faith 
differently within the different jurisdictions, it has to be said that with regard to good faith there are 
still incentives to choose a more favourable forum. For instance, it  makes sense for a party which 
wants to rely on the general principle of good faith to claim before a German court.  
In conclusions, there are differences in the application of good faith between the jurisdictions. 
Those differences are, however, to be expected since the Convention is applied by domestic courts. 
Violation of the principles of internationality and the principle of autonomous interpretation are the 
exceptions and not the rule. Therefore, all in all it can be spoken of an autonomous interpretation of 
good faith under Article 7 (1).
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